

Transference as Fiction

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Where does the Lacanian current within the psychoanalytic flow, stemming from and still fed by the well-spring of Freud's discoveries, locate the significance of transference? A seemingly cryptic response might indicate its role as exemplary indicator of the unity within diversity characteristic of the analytic movement. A unity determined by the ubiquity of the experience of transference; as a phenomenon produced by the plethora of conceptualisations of the process and consequent complementary procedural innovations.

However, while the ubiquity of the phenomenon of transference bears witness to the unity of the analytic experience, it cannot be considered the ground of that unity. This ground is produced by the fundamental rule of analysis, the injunction laid on the analysand concerning the non-omission of material. A burden quite as heavy is laid by Freud upon the analyst in the obverse of the fundamental rule, concerning the non-systematisation of the signifying material to which the analyst is the sink.

It is this policy of the fundamental rule which permits the Freudian unconscious to emerge in the faltering and overdetermination of the conscious communication. Therefore Lacan characterises the status of the Freudian unconscious as ethical rather than ontic. It is the continued adherence to this policy which provides the a posteriori unity to the group of Freudian analysts.

This unity is one of experience, both of the phenomena emergent from the application of the fundamental rule and of the curative automatism associated with it. This latter is a consequence of the phenomena of repetition and transference. These emerge close bound both conceptually and phenomenologically in the inaugural moments of psychoanalysis. Conceptually, Freud introduces transference in the Traumdeutung as the process of pathfinding whereby repressed unconscious thoughts are enabled to repetitively insist on communicating by means of an overdetermined adherence to otherwise anodyne signifying material. Phenomenologically, Freud names transference in the case study of Dora as the renewed experience of ultimately archaic love relations produced by the artifice of the analytic relationship. This obstacle to the easy production of signifying material in which Freud's insight detected the greatest potential benefit to the curative process is transference as signifying repetition. It is a staging of the reality of the unconscious. Lacan's doctrine of the signifier, developed during the 1950's, is an upholding and clarification of this schema and this experience.

It endeavours to defend the curative automatism of the transferential experience against the dilutions of innovative procedures. Hence the critique of any attempt to shatter the illusory effect of transference in bringing it back to the here and now of an interpersonal relationship; or to complement transference with a counter transferential experience on the part of analyst. Hence also the emphasis on interpretation within the transference as directed towards freeing the signifying material to resume its metonymic journey, rather than towards the generation of meaning.

It is in this confrontation and this critique that Lacan begins to realise that the analytic

stasis and disruption evoked by these inappropriate innovations cannot be eliminated simply by proper analytic technique. He comes to a realisation, as Freud had before him, that the negative aspects of the analytic domain, the gain from illness, the negative therapeutic reaction, the inertia of the symptom and the range of actions from acting out to fleeing analysis are intrinsic potentials and even productions of the analytic process in its own right.

It is in this context that the two-stage model of transference introduced by Lacan in Seminar XI ought perhaps to be understood. In the first phase, that of alienation, the analytic subject finds relief from anguish or its symptomatic replacements through identifying with a trait of the analyst, which causes the latter to function for the analysand as a signifying master. The functioning of the analyst as a subject supposed to know the truth of the analysand's distress locates and binds the unconscious knowledge through an automatic suggestive mechanism. The successful vacation of this position by the analyst abolishes the functioning of this trait and leaves the subject exposed to an experience which may, and ultimately will if the analysis proceeds sufficiently far, be that of an unshielded confrontation with the anguish of his being. This latter phase of transference, which Lacan called separation, should be experienced in the early phase of analysis as a pleasurable increase in autonomy, although technical mishandling of the gradual deepening of the analytic process will increase the burden of this autonomy, sometimes unbearably.

Lacan's development of the notion of an object cause of desire, the *objet petit a*, operating in the place of the analyst, should be seen as an attempt to find a pathway through this analytic impasse. It opens upon an altered transferential role for the analyst as the analysis proceeds, as a location for the construction of an object distilling the disgusting rapture proper to the being of the analytic subject. The question of transference thus debouches upon that of the end and ends of analysis in the possibility of a final cutting of the analytic symptom from its inertial moorings in unconscious pleasure. In this trajectory Lacan is not so much returning to Freud as returning with Freud to the dilemmas and impasses of possible successful termination of an individual analysis. Freud left us the heritage of this problem at the close of his career. Towards the close of Lacan's career he began to conceptually and procedurally innovate in search of solutions.

It is in the experience of the *passe* that he sought these insights. However, before directly approaching this question of the *passe* we will consider another theme which is found in Lacan's work. This is the notion of the relationship between psychoanalysis and fiction. The fiction in question is not derived from the tradition of literature. It is rather a product of the tradition of jurisprudence, with an ancestry sufficiently venerable as to encompass inclusion in Justinian's Digest of Roman Law. The context in which it comes to Lacan's attention is its importance in the work of the philosopher Jeremy Bentham.

Bentham is referred to by Lacan in a number of his seminars, in particular those seminars which mark a turning point in his teaching; Seminar VII on the ethics of psychoanalysis, Seminar XI on the fundamental concepts of psychoanalysis and Seminar XX on feminine sexuality and a logic to comprehend the ethical stance advanced in Seminar VII. In Seminar VII, Lacan marks a shift with respect to his concerns of the previous two years. Seminars five and six had been given over to an elaboration and development of his graph of desire, which may be considered as originating in Saussure's speech circuit. In Seminar VII the ethical status of this

concern with structure is addressed, initially in the context of the status of Freud's Project for a Scientific Psychology of 1896.

The significant extra dimension which Lacan adds in Seminar VII, in comparison with his previous consideration of the Project in Seminar II, where he had linked its logic with the psycho-energetics of Brucke and Helmholtz, is to recognize its indebtedness to and affinity with the philosophical tradition. In particular, Lacan recognizes that the concepts and themes which Freud elaborates in the Project belong to the tradition of philosophical ethics. He goes further and connects Freud's themes with his having attended Brentano's lectures on Aristotle during 1887. It is in the context of this resituating of the affinities of the Project that Lacan introduces the importance of Bentham's philosophy of pleasure, Utilitarianism, crediting Jacobson with being the one who had brought its importance to his attention. It is the concept of fiction which allows Lacan to appreciate the value of the innovation which Bentham wrought with respect to the space of traditional ethics.

The latter only slowly came to an appreciation of the importance of the legal notion of a fiction for an estimation of the creative role of ethical action. His initial stance, as an ardent supporter of the project of Enlightenment, was in four-square opposition to the legalistic fudging involved in the jurisprudential use of the notion of fiction.

The role of legal fictions had involved, since Roman times, ad hoc solutions to aporia in the attempted reconciliation of law and justice. In so far as the rigorous application of a code of law produced judgments which were recognized as anomalous and aberrant with respect to a commonly accepted sense of justice, legal exceptions were formulated, equivalent to epicycles within the Ptolemaic astronomical system and with an analogous function, whose purpose was to preserve a sense that the consistency of the ancient codes of law retained a connection with an ideal system of justice. In his Seminar VIII, on transference, Lacan examines the role of Ptolemaic epicycles in similarly sustaining an anciently sanctioned ideal.

The early Bentham will have no truck with this saving of appearances. He wishes to reformulate the legal codes root and branch, so that the domain of equity, the jurisprudential arena concerned with the reconciliation of law and justice, will coincide exactly with the guide to rational ethical action and its consequences, embodied in a legal code which would be at once natural and rational. It is here that the philosophy of Utilitarianism is sourced, in the attempted superposition of equity, ethics and a rational jurisprudence. Bentham transforms the search of a traditional philosophical ethics for a code of personal mastery which would guarantee the alignment of the specific good in its accumulation with the Sovereign Good as ultimate goal, into a social philosophy which re-presents this traditional drama on the broader stage of society. This move on his part is a continuation of the trajectory through which *oikonomia*, the study from antiquity of the good management of the household, was transformed during the 17th and 18th centuries into political economy.

Where traditional ethics had sought to isolate and accumulate a pleasure conformable to the nature and destiny of man, Bentham radicalises this project through quantifying and unitising pleasure, as happiness, such that a calculus of pleasures might be generated in a field which would permit an ideal summation. Lacan comments on this new project as follows: "The long historical development of the problem of the good is in the end centered on the notion of how goods are created, insofar as they are organized not on the basis of so-called natural and predetermined needs, but insofar as they furnish the material of a distribution; and it

is in relation to this that the dialectic of the good is articulated to the degree that it takes on effective meaning for man. Man's needs find their home on the level of utility, which involves that portion of the symbolic text that may be of some use. At this stage there is no problem; the greatest good for the greatest number - such indeed is the law in the light of which the problem of the functioning of goods is organized. At this level we find ourselves, in effect prior to the moment when the subject puts his head through the holes in the cloth. The cloth is made so that the greatest number possible of subjects may put their head and their limbs through it." (Lacan, 1986: pp; 228-229)

This project is part of an historical shift which Foucault ascribes to the latter quarter of the 18th century, whereby the search for an ideal tabular representation of the things of the world associated with the philosophy of mathesis, is replaced by a search for the conceptual operator appropriate to each domain, which would produce an analytic calculus of the phenomena pertaining to the field. Foucault also notes the emergence of a new discursive formation at the beginning of the 19th century which he terms an 'analytics of finitude'. In a further shift from the philosophy of representation of the Classical Age, the linchpins of knowledge became transcendentals, figures such as Life, Labour, Language, Space, and Number, which functioned as the linchpins, both source and sink, for analytic investigation.

Bentham's position also changed, but not in this direction. He did absorb the notion of a positive succession, of a change over time which would be amelioratively cumulative, as opposed to the Enlightenment assumption that the universe of reason could, and should be established by fiat. He now held that the agency through which changed social circumstances and needs could be integrated into a coherent social pattern was a generalisation of that same concept of jurisprudential fiction which he had vigorously challenged earlier in his career. He now held that it was the creative mechanism through which progressive social development was assured.

The significance of this formulation of a new and central role for the notion of jurisprudential fiction, is that it offers an immanentist rather than a transcendental dynamic to human creativity and social evolution. In this regard Bentham might perhaps be regarded as a 'true monster', using the term which Foucault advances to characterise Mendel's conceptual 'prematurity' in genetics, foreshadowing the philosophy of the *Übermensch*. We can see the logic of Bentham's use of the notion of fiction in the explanation given by Lacan in Seminar V for the change in meaning of the French word *atterré* during the 17th century. It had originally meant thrown to the ground. Lacan contends that the syllable *ter*, originally associated with *terre*, shifted its association to the word *terroir*, thus from ground to terror. The motive for this shift was the emergence of a new social experience of profound unease. Therefore, the shift in the meaning of the word *atterré* from implying 'thrown violently to the ground' to 'being overwhelmed by a fearful bewilderment' allowed expression to be given to this new social experience.

It is this *ex nihilo* aspect of Bentham's idea of fiction which Lacan emphasises in Seminar VII. However, the use which he makes of the notion of fiction in Seminar XI involves an added dimension. In reference to a remark of Freud's that the drive is one of our myths, Lacan offers what he considers to be more suitable terms: "... I will ignore this term myth; indeed in the same text, in the first paragraph, Freud uses the word *Konvention*, convention, which is much closer to what we are talking about and to which I would apply the Benthamite term fiction, which I have mapped for my followers. This term, I should say in passing, is much more preferable than that of

model, which has been all too much abused. In any case, model is never a *Grundbegriff*, for, in a certain field, several models may function correlatively. This is not the case for a *Grundbegriff*, for a fundamental concept, nor for a fundamental fiction." (Lacan, 1973:163)

The form in which he presents the process of the drive reinforces the fictive impression of its organisation. The metaphor he advances is of the similarity between the drive and a surrealist montage. "If we bring together the paradoxes that we just defined at the level of *Drang*, at that of the object, at that of the aim of the drive, I think that the resulting image would show the working of a dynamo connected up to a gas-tap, a peacock's feather emerges, and tickles the belly of a beautiful woman, who is just lying there looking beautiful. Indeed, the thing begins to become interesting from this very fact, that the drive defines, according to Freud, all the forms of which one may reverse such a mechanism. This does not mean that one turns the dynamo upside down - one unrolls its wires, it is they that become the peacock's feather, the gas-tap goes into the lady's mouth, and the bird's rump emerges in the middle." (ibid.: 169)

The significant aspect of this presentation of the process of the drive, is that it is impossible for us to think it. In this, it is similar to the classificatory list, derived from Borges' Book of Imaginary Beings, which Foucault presents in the preface to Les Mots et Les Choses. Foucault is emphasising that it is almost impossible for us to think the knowledges of the Classical Age as pertaining to a real. This difficulty in accommodating a different discursive formation is complemented by the difficulty of thinking a *Grundbegriff* from within a discursive formation. In the case of the Classical discursive formation, Newton's inverse square law embodied a notion of action at a distance which was incommensurable with the aspiration to develop a taxonomy which would unbrokenly mirror the continuity of things. The hiatus implied by action at a distance was unthinkable to this latter project, leading to an initial rejection of Newton's formulation: "At the time, thinkers came up with all kinds of objections - this gravitation is unthinkable, we've never seen the like of this action at a distance, across a void, every kind of action is by definition an action of things in contact with one another." (Lacan, 1978, p.239)

The notion of the drive presents analogous conundra for our own discursive formation. We are forced to use it due to the coherence that it brings to a field of theory and practice, yet it itself fails to cohere with the systematic internal consistency demanded by the modern project of science. Indeed, as expounded by Lacan, cf. above, it rather functions as a parodic subversion of this aspiration to consistency.

This latter point returns us to the significance of the concept of fiction, but with an added twist. In the Benthamite formulation, it is the conduit of symbolic stabilisation of the exigencies of historical progress. In light of the above discussion of Lacan's extension of the term to cover the *Grundbegriff* of a conceptual domain, we are I feel legitimated in the use of the concept of fiction to cover both the process and the residue of the unhinging of a *Weltanschauung*. This brings together in a single movement the Benthamite and the Lacanian notions. It gives the former an accent which is active rather than reactive, while the latter acquires the status of an originary or founding exception. The Benthamite strand involves an hystericisation of the original dynamic, the emphasis shifting from the suturing role of a reactive conceptual fiction to the splitting effect of an initiatory fiction. The Lacanian strand shifts the notion of a *Grundbegriff* towards the logic of an exception embodied in the laws of sexualisation. The exception delimits and therefore grounds the coherence of a universe

of consistency.

There is, however, a further point to consider before these ideas gain immediate relevance to the experience of analytic transference. This concerns the functioning of Ideals. The significance of the functioning of Ideals is that they also operate in the direction of giving consistency to a universe. Indeed, the installation of the 'subject supposed to know' in the initial consolidation of transference is based on a signifying identification which has the same structure as the installation of the Ego Ideal in the terminal phase of the Oedipus. In so far as analysis is conceived as a process of the rectification of Ideals then it will have a form analogous to that of a progressive paradigm shift or the emergence of a more livable *Weltanschauung*. The hystericised moments of analysis are but facilitatory transitional phenomena in this scenario. The dislocations between knowledge and truth are punctiform and destined to disappear in the resulting synthesis.

Throughout his teaching, in its various phases, Lacan never subscribed to this version of the aim of analysis. As he became more preoccupied with the aporias of the end phase of analysis in the later period of his teaching, he came to consider the subversion of Ideals as a prerequisite for the termination of an analysis. It is here that the experiment and the phenomenon of the *passee* are located.

On one level, the question of the *passee* concerns the transmission of psychoanalytic knowledge. In these terms it is part of the sequence of initiatives, which includes the 'cartel', seeking to free psychoanalysis from the weight of institutional tradition. However, the pressure of institutional tradition is most significantly the burden of Ideals. The problem of the psychoanalytic group has the same structure as that of the Ego, the Ego Ideal and the Ideal Ego. *La passee* is the residue of a rite of passage, a write of passage, which bears witness to and indeed stages an alternative pathway of transmission to that of tradition, of that tradition which is carried along in the Ideals of the group and in its initiatory procedures.

The structure of this *passee* has at least two distinct phases. Firstly, the one undergoing the 'passee', the *passant*, endeavours to communicate to his peers, the *passseurs*, those undergoing the same process of the *passee*, something of the residue of the experience of the personal analysis. This residue cannot be a summation or a deduction à propos the experience, since this would imply a pre-given closure or unity to the experience, and vitiate the concept of dialectical openness. It must be conceived as a conduit from one symbolic universe to another, with respect to the initial universe acting as a kernel of truth whose insistence finally separates the subject from the symbolic universe, producing a 'subjective destitution'. Contrariwise, with respect to the second symbolic universe, the residue functions as an exception which lends coherence and consistency to this universe, while insistently attesting to its incompleteness. It is something of this latter functioning which must sufficiently impinge upon the *passseurs* as to communicate itself to the panel of the *passee*, to whom they report their encounters with the *passant*.

This latter procedure constitutes the second phase of the *passee*. It is based on the capacity of the residue of the analysis of the *passant* to resonate in the report of the *passseurs*. This completes the first stage, the subjective stage, in the dissemination of the *passee*. It is followed by the requirement of five years of teaching, which may be considered the objective stage in the dissemination of the consequences of an analysis carried to the point of the *passee*.

It is clear that there is an homology between this conception of the *passe* and the version of the concept of fiction which we have advanced above. The comparison emphasises that we must conceive of a double presence, a deferred action, a *Nachtraglichkeit*, as underpinning the functioning of the notion of fiction. The element or elements which in a previous time, a previous symbolic universe, failed to find a stable place, a symbolic representation, to the extent of eventually facilitating the disintegration of that symbolic universe, in a second time function so as to give consistency to a symbolic universe. The same elements which produce a disintegrative inconsistency in a complete symbolic universe, produce an ameliorative consistency in an incomplete symbolic universe.

In these terms, the concept of fiction might well be considered as the obverse of the quilting effects of symbolic Ideals. Whereas the signifying alienation underpinning the Ego Ideal passes present impasses by way of the promise of future fulfilment, the function of fiction, as we have outlined it, is to convert past impasses into the conduits of a present passage. This distinction is strikingly illustrated in a text by Paul Henry, Le Point de Vue, based on the moment of doubt, which Henry calls a moment of the *passe*, undergone by the mathematician Gauss at the close of the 18th century, with respect to the validity of geometrical knowledge.

Drawing upon the work of Foucault and of Ian Hacking we may characterise the discursive formation which emerged in the Classical Period, the 17th and 18th centuries, as based on the ideal of an ultimate mathesis, of an universal perfectly analytic language, which would analyse and classify perfectly in the very process of naming things. Underpinning this aspiration was the language of mathematics, conceived as a perfectly analytic language, a spontaneous natural philosophy, intimating the voice of God through the Book of Nature. Hence the central place of geometry throughout these centuries, from Descartes through to Gauss. It represents the 'real' interface between the phenomenal world of the senses and the language of Reason which represents this world in thought. If Newton's laws seemed to capture the incontrovertible basic units, the fundamental and obvious 'real' categories, producing the phenomenal vicissitudes of matter in motion, these categories functioned in a space which was conceived as Euclidean. Thus, the basic postulates of Euclid's geometry were likewise conceived as fundamentally 'real' and incontrovertible.

It was this circumstance which gave added force to the attempts to prove conclusively the validity of the Vth postulate, from the late 17th century onwards. This postulate, pertaining to the 'problem of parallels', had been judged from Antiquity as less evident than the others and, consequently, as requiring demonstration. Stemming from the work of Saccheri in 1733, the method of proof by way of contradiction, the *reductio ad absurdum*, was the approach adopted by a series of mathematicians, including Lambert, Farkas Bolyai and Gauss himself. Paradoxically, in failing to demonstrate the inherent contradictions in the consequences derived from alternative suppositions to that of the Vth postulate, these mathematicians developed entire sections of non-Euclidean geometry. These developments were condemned to go unrecognized so long as the project of mathesis retained its status as a dominant cultural ideal. The weakening of this project in the late eighteenth century provided the opportunity for a reassessment of the status of the fifth postulate.

However, as Paul Henry forcibly argues, this reassessment did not occur without a significant crisis, which he detects in the position of Gauss with respect to the status

of geometry. He notes a letter from Gauss to Farkas Bolyai in late 1799, in which the former derogates from the latter's belief that he has succeeded in demonstrating the postulate. In fact, Gauss asserts that the path which he himself is following is leading him to 'doubt geometry itself'. Henry associates this path with Gauss' commitment to a notion of mathematical rigour, the *rigor antiquus*, derived from the approach of the ancients, beyond the immediate content of their work, in pledge to which he was willing to abandon the content of geometrical knowledge.

Henry detects in this moment of doubt a disjunction in the positions of knowledge and truth, which betokens the 'defile of a rejection of knowledge as being foundational, from the point of view of the subject, in the order of what one calls "modern science"'. In the logic of Henry's argument, this *rigor antiquus*, which is nowhere in the ancient texts, nevertheless functions to support a *supposé savoir*, a transferential relationship to the text of Euclid. I feel that this position is in need of some modification. It seems clear to me that the project of an ideal mathesis certainly gave a transferential cast to the relationship of previous mathematicians to these canonical texts. However, the effect of the *rigor antiquus* seems to have more of the qualities of an interpretation, in the sense of the unquilting, of the littering, of the support of unconscious identification. Nevertheless, the littering of the unconscious letter does not reduce the effectiveness of the concept of the *rigor antiquus*, rather the reverse, according to Paul Henry. He contends that the notion of such a rigour, explicitly adhered to, underpins the depth and originality of Gauss' later work, by comparison with that of his contemporaries.

It is possible to understand the dynamic at play here if we consider that through the prism of the moment of doubt the notion of rigour changed its signification. It may be considered that prior to the moment of doubt the notion of rigour supports the ideal of a mathesis and is assimilable to Leibnitz's 'universal characteristic'. It functions as a sort of fundamental 'synthetic a priori'. Through the omega point of the separation between knowledge and truth embodied in the moment of doubt, the symbolic universe of the project of an ideal mathesis collapses through this very point which had been its linchpin. One might perhaps suggest that this represents the return of the *a* into the place of the *A* (the symbolic universe), from which it had been banished by the project of mathesis initiated by Leibnitz and his contemporaries. The rigour as an ideal becomes rigour as a method, through a process of identification with rigour on Gauss' part, in the traumatic point of separation represented by the moment of doubt. Rather than a return to another alienating identification, such as Foucault has charted for us in the transcendently based 'analytics of finitude' of the early 19th century, we have an identification with a point of impossibility with respect to an ideal knowledge, one which would be both true and 'real' at the same time. Henry is of the opinion that Gauss' identification with the *rigor antiquus*, embodied in the moment of doubt, is at the origin of mathematics as a "modern science"; that it is " ... from this moment that a 'point of view' properly logical and mathematical has been defined in geometry. One can then truly say that it is from this moment that one dates the advent of modern geometry."

This is a valid assessment up to a point, although it leaves out of account the distinction between the internal dynamic of the discipline and the conceptions of mathematical truth, knowledge and objects resulting from reflections on its development. One might suggest that Gauss' moment of doubt has been infrequently revisited over the past two centuries, even if the style which he initiated has become commonplace. This moment of the *passe*, as Paul Henry terms it, is the significant factor in the re-orientation of the subject to the emergence of a distinct and different

symbolic universe. Nevertheless, at the end of his paper, he is concerned to point out what seem to him to be some central differences between this *passee* available to the subject in mathematics and the psychoanalytic variant. His first point is that “... a mathematical result once established cannot but end up by being recognized, even to the point of defending it with their lives, by the other mathematicians. All is then suspended in the establishment of the result.” By contrast, “... if analysis aims at the blanks in our history, the holes around which organizes itself memory and memories, the blanks appear as such only in the analytic situation. The analytic situation is necessary, namely the intervention of the analyst who names them, for them to appear as such. In the second place, if it is true that analysis operates only from an enunciation, this, in its letter, by contrast with a mathematical result, has interest only for the one who is lacking and awaiting it. It is for the analyst and the pathway of his truth, in a privative sense. Here we touch upon what necessitates the analyst and analytic transference for analysis in its specificity. Because, ultimately, the enunciation aspired to during analysis can operate only in remaining *en souffrance* and being awaited, because it has not had its recipient at a moment of the history of the subject in which it was necessary that it could be articulated and not be lacking.”

The concept of fiction, as we have outlined it previously, allows us to reconcile what appear to Henry to be irreconcilable divergences between the functioning of a subjective *passee* at a crisis point of mathematics and its presence at the end of an analysis. In so far as the process of ‘subjective destitution’ is an experience of the faltering, to the point of failure, of the stabilising function of ideal identification, one slope of the notion of fiction which we have introduced may be viewed as carrying the subject through this experience, so that the experience is sustained as a separation, rather than returning to alienating identification. For this to be possible, the ‘working through’ of the analysis must have wrought its effects, in exhausting knowledge of its ideal supports; just as the *ad absurdum* procedures of 18th century geometry generate aporia with respect to any ideal conclusion. The desire of the analyst is the only possible stable guide in maintaining this fissuring within the supports of knowledge in an ideal truth. At the close of Seminar XI, Lacan indicates the structure of the ethical underpinnings of this desire: “... if the transference is that which separates demand from the drive, the analyst’s desire is that which brings it back. And in this way, it isolates the *a*, places it at the greatest possible distance from the *I* that he, the analyst, is called upon by the subject to embody. It is from this idealization that the analyst has to fall in order to be the support of the separating *a*, in so far as his desire allows him, in an upside-down hypnosis, to embody the hypnotized patient.” (Lacan, 1973, p.273)

If we connect this point concerning the desire of the analyst with Lacan’s remarks on the subjective status of the corpus of scientific knowledge some few pages earlier: “We will not appreciate the full implication of this corpus of science if we do not recognize that it is, in the subjective relation, the equivalent of what I have called here the *objet petit a*.” (ibid.p. 265) Then we can see that the analyst’s desire is functioning as a locus for implications, within the fragments of knowledge congealed from the subject’s speech, inassimilable to his ideals, in a manner analogous to the separating effect of scientific knowledge with respect to scientific ideals, as we have noted in the case of the problem of parallels.

Thus the rigour which supported Gauss in his experience of the separation of knowledge from truth functions in an analogous manner to the operation of the analyst’s desire within psychoanalysis, and is one slope of the concept of fiction which we have outlined. The effect is privative and particular within analysis, but

ultimately 'extimate' rather than personal. It is identification with the desire of the analyst which permits the analysand, on the cusp of becoming analyst, to re-invent analysis on the grounds of the symptomatic inassimilabilities of the experience of personal analysis. They give flesh to the enigma of the drive, becoming the outcrop of its material cause.

This leads us to the second slope of the concept of fiction as we have outlined it. The integration of the particular and the general, the recentring or refocussing of the general structure through the introduction of a particular element, is achieved by way of the irreducibly aporic aspect of each. It is the operation of separation as *Nachträglichkeit* which is in question here. We must consider that Freud's desire has the same function within psychoanalytic transmission as the *antiquus* conjoined with the rigour in the case of Gauss. What superficially seems to refer to a *terminus a quo* is in reality an allusion to a *terminus ad quem*. Henry, in his paper on Gauss, fails to recognise the link between the ascription of *antiquus* to rigour and Gauss' confidence that a mathematical result once proven, must eventually come to be recognised by the body of mathematicians. This is, perhaps, the key to the transference effect of all canonical texts, i.e. they provide the basis for a group psychology.

However, we may divide this effect into two streams, appealing to Barthes' distinction between a work and a text. The former belongs to a sequence which is unified by ideals. The latter is unified around a problematic, an organised domain of theses, problems and questions, underpinning a regime of investigation.

With respect to this notion of text we must consider that it requires anchoring in the concept of a 'letter'. An unconscious letter is that which binds *jouissance* to the signifier of a symptom and ensures the circuit of an endless repetition. Through the effect of interpretation in separating the signifier of a symptom from *jouissance* the letter is turned into litter and is enabled to float away on the signifying chain. However, insofar as we conceive of an irreducible symptomatic core at the end of an analysis, we must consider that the symptom can only become a formal envelope to the extent that the *jouissance* binds and insists elsewhere. We may pose this elsewhere as the domain of group identification, the domain where the group cannot but accept the conclusion of the analytic experience. Freud has characterised this conclusion as the ability to love and to work. We may here interpret love as the force binding the particular symptom to the symptom of the group; not a dissolving but a resolving of the transference. In like manner, we may interpret work as the repetitive insistence transferred from the individual to the group symptom. This would imply a letter which is not littered, but displaced from an individual to a group repetitive resonance.

This formulation allows us to effect a reconciliation between Freud's concept of sublimation from Creative Writers and Daydreaming and Lacan's examination of the concept in his Seminar VII. In this seminar he comments on what he sees as the inadequacy of Freud's characterisation of sublimation in the creative writers paper, as resting on the capacity of artists to persuade an audience to support the public presentation of transgressive desires and fantasies in an unadorned or barely disguised fashion. Derogating from a concept of sublimation which involves either evasion of, or submission and reconciliation to public norms, Lacan offers an alternative notion of sublimation based on two elements. Firstly, the raising of an object to the dignity of the Thing. Secondly, and consequently, the abandoning of that same object to a domain of the inaccessible. This 'paying with the pound of flesh' allows access to a creative substitution for the original inaccessibility of the Thing,

permitting satisfaction without repression.

That there could be satisfaction without repression, Freud relates to a change in the aim of the drive, yet since the aim of the drive is satisfaction, two consequences flow from this fact in the light of Lacan's position. Firstly, the shift in the aim must relate to the '...without repression' associated with the satisfaction. Secondly, the satisfaction of the drive is the drive itself, it is its own satisfaction in its endless circulation around the object, in so far as the object in this instance is regarded as the always already lost object, effectively the Thing. Here sublimation must be conceived as a restaging of this circuit, in its movement as drive from the real to the symbolic, yet in the opposite direction. Whereas the trajectory of the drive associated with repression involves a remembering in order to forget, a screen memory, an hysterical conversion, perhaps the formations of the unconscious and alienating transference itself; sublimation, on the other hand, involves a forgetting, a loss of orientation, a dark night of the soul, whose consequence is the remembering, the saving of knowledge which would otherwise remain unrecognised. The forgetting and the remembering are both necessary to the dynamic of sublimation, since without the remembering the circuit would not repeat, the experience would be punctiform, and repression would re-establish itself.

In the *Fort-Da* game, it is true that the *Fort* is the crucial strophe, yet it is the antistrophe, the *Da*, which ensures that the game can become an endless one. Furthermore, it is, in practical experience, the support of an embodied Other, which supports the iteration as endless. In like manner, it is the functioning of an embodied Other which supports sublimation and prevents its collapse back into repression. However, the analogy conceals a significant distinction. This concerns the point within the Other from which the response issues. In the case of the child, it is to be expected that this point will be that of an Ideal. In the case of sublimation, on the other hand, it is from the point of renunciation of the Ideal that the response emerges. Otherwise, the effect would entail a disavowal of knowledge not consonant with the Ideal and a subversion of the separation crucial to the dynamic of sublimation.

The linchpin of sublimation, as Freud advances it in Creative Writers and Daydreaming, is consonant with this notion of the importance of the Other as support. This Other takes the form of public approbation and valorization leading to pecuniary remuneration. This permits the artist to realize fantasies bearing unconscious wishes and the public to vicariously enjoy a measure of release of their own transgressive wishes in the wake of the path cloven by the artist. In outline, this is the form of the addition to Lacan's notion of sublimation which we have suggested above. Lacan himself suggests that the sublimation embodied in the project of courtly love as a moral and social code is an example which justifies Freud's emphasis on the social dimension of sublimation. Yet this does not offer a location of the link between the individual and the group in the dynamic of sublimation. The congruity which we have established between the notions of transference as fiction and the logic of the *passe* as we have derived it from Paul Henry's text on Gauss, and which we have now shown can be extended to cover the notion of sublimation, will allow us to pinpoint conceptually the transformation through which the bond between the individual and the group, and based on a transference of separation, is forged.

We are assuming that the '...without repression' operates just as the *antiquus* does in Gauss' case, i.e. *à lacantonade*, it is broadcast; and that the satisfaction, which provides the other side of the formula of sublimation, involves a separation of knowledge of a particular kind, and truth. The particular kind of knowledge which is

lost might be characterised as carnal knowledge, by analogy with the elevation of the status of the Lady of the troubadours to a realm beyond carnal knowledge. It is also captured in the formula that a knot of *jouissance* is cut, is separated from the symptom, at the close of an analysis, leaving the formal envelope of the symptom to float. In this instance we may suggest that *jouissance* produces a knowledge in the body.

However, if we offer sublimation as one version of the *terminus ad quem* closing an analysis, Freud alerts us to the function of the fantasy as the *terminus a quo* of this closure. How can we interpret the crossing of the plane of the fantasy in so far as it leads to a sublimation of the kind which we envisage? Here we may draw upon J-A Miller's characterization of the fundamental fantasy from his seminar on symptom and fantasy (1982, unpublished). He specifies the fundamental fantasy as the locus of intersection of primary masochism and primal repression. The significant thing about these latter categories from our point of view is that they are both tied to the functioning of the signifier; the first marks the coalescence of signifier and flesh, while the second occludes the mark of the signifier, thus engendering the space for the functioning of ideals. The point of suture of these categories is archetypically captured in Freud's depiction of the second moment of the fantasy in his A Child is being Beaten.

If we consider that the weight of inassimilable knowledge produced in the course of an analysis reaches a pitch whereby the space of repression is breached to the point of fragility, it is conceivable that the dynamic of sublimation such as we have outlined it above may come into play. In this case we are confronted with a new intersecting dyad, that of primary masochism and a foundational sublimation. This suturing might be termed that of a fundamental fiction by way of analogy with the notion of a fundamental fantasy.

Two points might be made in this regard. Firstly, we need not think of this new suturing as an exclusive operation. It is compatible with the continuance of the first suturing, although with the latter restricted in its range. Secondly, in this new configuration we may think of the matheme of the fantasy as implying a reverse movement to that of the neurotic fantasy trajectory. Whereas the latter moves from the real of the subject to the covering of an imaginised object, the former moves from a transference of separation to the installation of subjective division as the focus of a dynamic of atonement.

Returning, for the last time, to Henry's remarks on the differences in the last instance between mathematics and psychoanalysis, we might suggest that there is some evidence that there is also within the domain of mathematical originality, and of intellectual originality in general, a privative element such as Henry ascribes exclusively to psychoanalysis. It is perhaps no accident that Gauss did not publish his work on parallels, although it was the postmortem publication of his correspondence which rescued the work of Bolyai and Lobachevsky from obscurity. We might hazard that although the method, we should more properly say the ethic, which produced this work as positive knowledge, was to be the hallmark of his subsequent mathematical style, the investment in, we might almost say the identification with this work was of such a personal nature as to militate against his easily parting with it. The sensitivity of Janos Bolyai to suggestions of Gauss' precedence might well be of the same order. Indeed, it might be possible to extend this notion to encompass the place of Descartes' prophetic dreams in relation to his subsequent work. Finally, it might be well worth investigating whether Freud's Project for a Scientific Psychology might not

also belong to the same class of phenomena; profound transitional objects, fundamental transference fictions for our culture.

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