

DESIRE IN DREAMS.

Marc Du Ry, May 1992

“When I am awake, they assail me but lacking in strength; in sleep they assail me not only so as to arouse pleasure, but even consent and something very like the dream itself. So great a power have these deep images over my soul and my flesh that these false visions persuade me when asleep to do what true sights cannot persuade me to when awake.

At such times am I not myself, O Lord my God? Yet so great a difference is there between myself and that same self of mine within the moment when I pass from waking to sleep or return hither from sleep! At such times where is reason, by which man awake resists those suggestions, and remains unshaken even if the very deeds themselves are urged upon him? Is it closed together with my eyes? Is it asleep together with the body's senses? How is it that even in sleep we often resist, and mindful of our resolution, persist in it most chastely, and yield no assent to such allurements? Yet so great a difference obtains that, when it happens otherwise we return on awakening to peace of conscience. By that very contrast we discover that it was not ourselves who did what we yet grieve over as in some manner done within us.”

St Augustine, Confessions, ch. 30.

Moving lines from one of the first moved to plumb the depths of his desire for the desire of the Other, lines which in themselves furnish all the material for a theory of dreams, down to the misrecognition in the last sentence. In this paper, I will follow Lacan¹ in articulating the dialectical nature of Freud's thinking on one aspect of the practice of psychoanalysis, the interpretation of dreams, a dialectic which has a direction which goes from wish to desire, or from dreaming to speaking, and aims at reality. It is a preliminary mapping, rather than an investigation, which arose from attempts to situate desire in the practice, insofar as Freud maintained that desire was the most “reality” a subject could hope for. Focussing on The Interpretation of Dreams, I used those of Dora, whose case Freud saw as an extension of his dream book, to begin to look at the four “formations” (symptom, dream, parapraxis and joke) of the unconscious and their relation to desire, the drive and love.

I.


Wish or Desire.

The title reflects a tension which is potentially misleading, for everybody knows that in Freud's dream theory, a dream achieves wish fulfilment and a wish is not the same as a desire, though they may have the same source. A dream, exactly like a symptom, is a compromise between a preconscious and an unconscious wish. Desire here designates a wish which is unconscious and indestructible. Like anxiety, it is not without an object, but unlike a wish, it has no transitive relation to this object.

The question becomes one of whether it is sufficient to analyse a dream by exhaustively going over the components (signifiers) of the manifest dream insofar as

from them the “latent” dream thought could be extracted as a wish, the way Freud said a hysterical symptom can be traced back to its determinants, or whether something extra is needed, like the act of interpretation (as in the title of Freud's book), in order to grasp something of desire, of the wish as unconscious.

Lacan maintains the latter in the Direction of the Treatment, where he also points up the opposition which is at the core of this paper: “To do so [to be the organiser of the signifying flow of the dream], to find oneself as desirer, is the opposite of getting oneself recognised as the subject of it, for it is as a derivation of the signifying chain that the channel of desire flows...”. He puts it a slightly different way in the same text: the dream is made for the recognition of desire (wish fulfilment is an instance) but it serves the wish for sleep in which one is not recognised. To examine the basis of this essential distinction between dreaming and telling a dream in a session, distinction which reveals the peculiarity of psychoanalysis, requires the kind of model of the mental apparatus and its functioning which Freud drew up most completely in the Project for a Scientific Psychology of 1896, Chapter VII of the Interpretation of Dreams, and then played with throughout his later work, and which Lacan investigates in the first part of Seminar VII, providing the diagram which will form the reference point for this paper.



Metapsychology and Dialectics.

Without undue simplification, we could summarise the Freudian conceptual scaffolding as follows. Two laws or principles called Pleasure Principle and Reality Principle, support two kinds of processes or methods, called Primary and Secondary, while governing two aims or drives (instincts), self-preservation and sexuality (species-preservation). This irreducible duality has its source in original helplessness (*Hilflosigkeit*). It is the biological given of prolonged prematurity, the fact that the onset of (sexual) maturation in human beings is biphasic.

Similarly, a single Principle of Mental Functioning is quite insufficient, for the automatism of pleasure whose aim is identity of perception can be misdirected. It is insufficient because on the one hand, it does not enable the organism to flee from internal stimuli; nor, on the other hand, can it alter the external world by means of what Freud called a “specific action” to achieve a satisfaction which is not hallucinatory.

A second principle is needed to correct and guide what are only blind moves towards homeostasis. This principle, however, is one which cannot move the organism of its

own accord. There is no more apt image of the relation between the two principles than the one of the blind man carrying the cripple who guides the former's steps. Lacan has noted their chiasmic relation: the Reality Principle actually isolates the subject from reality by ultimately working for homeostasis; whereas the Pleasure Principle states that pleasure should cease, in other words, that tension be maintained close to that necessary minimum level which is dictated by what Freud called "*Not des Lebens*" (Project). This exigency of life is a function of reality, as below this level, life would cease or correspond to a coma.

The two "Classes of Instinct" slot in rather differently into this elementary organisation of "Quantity in a state of flow" (Project)², that elementary living substance which corresponds to Lacan's "*Jouissance*". According to Freud, the sexual "Instinct"³ is at first auto-erotic and not as much subject to the kind of privation in the real (such as the absence of the breast) which led to the institution of the Reality Principle. Moreover, suggests Freud, initial object finding is soon interrupted by a latency period. The important result of these two factors is a much stronger link between sexual needs and thought processes of a Primary kind, those given over to pleasure, like day dreams and fantasies, while self-preservative needs, like hunger, are more closely linked with the Secondary process which takes account of reality and includes the fact of consciousness.

Even here, there is chiasmus. The wish corresponding to this need for self preservation at the level of the dream is precisely the wish to sleep since sleep preserves the body. On the other hand, the wish for sexual satisfaction, in the broadest sense, caught up as it is from the beginning in a signifying chain, becomes a wish to, in Freud's words, "achieve representation", which involves reality, and moves in the direction of waking.

Pleasure and Reality.

Lacan plots this dialectical relation of the two Principles on his diagram by distinguishing three moments: 1. The substance or subject of experience; 2. A process which is either primary or secondary, either perception or thought; 3. the object, which is either known or unknown.

1. At this level, on the side of pleasure, he places the subject's Good (Kantian *Wohl*), which is linked to a perception and cathexis of certain qualities or attributes (*Vorstellungen*) of the object in the Unconscious. However, though the Good supports the Pleasure Principle, it is itself inimical to it, because it is always either too much or too little. That is one reason the Reality Principle comes in between the subject and his Good in the form of thought. On the other side, what Lacan termed "the substratum of reality" in the subjective process, is left as a question mark.

2. At the level of process, the diagram seems to indicate a radical choice: either thought or perception, reality or pleasure, but it is reality in the field of pleasure and pleasure in the field of reality. Most strikingly, there is no reality without thought.

3. At the level of the object, Lacan tells us, the Pleasure Principle regulates the facilitations (*Bahnungen*) or associations between ideas (*Vorstellungen*), according to mechanisms of condensation and displacement. On the other side, what is known, is known as words, as something that can be said.

Lacan bids us remember that if there are *bahnungen* at all, it is due to the fact that signs of perceptions (*Wahrnehmungszeichen*)⁴ and memory traces, registrations in the unconscious, are laid down (as "*Niederschriften*")⁵ in an initial synchrony, - similar

to Braque's cubist recreation of an object on canvas, - in other words, that it has the minimal structure of any signifying apparatus.

Of equal importance is the point that the Pleasure Principle does not regulate thought. Thought processes only submit to the Pleasure Principle to the extent that they are inaccessible to perception. It is the Reality Principle that regulates thought, but again only insofar as it is articulated in speech. This speech is an effort, a specific action. Lacan emphasises that it is only in his own words (Cs) that the subject can perceive something of his ideas (Ucs) as they are articulated in thoughts (Pcs). In the same way, the Reality Principle can only influence the Pleasure Principle through thought processes which regulate the cathexis of ideas. This too, occurs by means of words, and is a basis for the Lacanian ethic, formulated later, of speaking well. If each side of the diagram is seen as a (force) field, one can see the difficulties of achieving "identity of thought" within the field of pleasure, a point Freud stresses in Chapter VII of The Interpretation of Dreams.

Unconscious.

It might be helpful to tie Freud's ideas on the unconscious⁶ into the diagram, because, after all, the notion of the signifier in psychoanalysis is like the old atom in physics - the material one works with. We could then place the "Thing presentations" (*Ding Vorstellungen*) at the level of the Unconscious, while both "object" and "word presentations" (*Sach* and *Wort Vorstellungen*) are in touch with what can be spoken or known in reality. These are at the level of thought processes, which would correspond to the Preconscious of Freud's first topography. Lacan, reading the Project, isolates the Unconscious in an "*ich*" system as "function", that is, concerned with keeping reality at a distance and preserving a more or less uniform cathexis (*Gleichbesetzung*) which is also the necessary minimum store required to satisfy the *Not des Lebens*. At the level of thought processes, on the other hand, we have "structure" which is *Aufbau*, building up, spreading tension through "complication" or decreasing tension through discharge in a "specific action".

Certain distinctions deserve a mention here. Lacan comments that condensation (unCs), unlike metaphor (preconscious), brings no meaning, nor does displacement, unlike metonymy, carry any being. Is this not what Freud implies when he says that the dreamwork, which is condensation and displacement, does not think, calculate or judge? What it does do is cipher, diachronically, which is why it does not make "sense". Analytic work, which is a deciphering, brings it back to synchrony, whose minimum term Lacan defines as the fantasy $\$ \leftrightarrow a$. Perhaps that is why he would say much later that no analysis, no decipherment is complete unless it has "crossed" the fundamental fantasy.

Dreaming or Speaking.

We can now use the diagram to sharpen the distinction between dreaming and the telling of a dream. If a dream is fulfilment of a wish, it must proceed in the direction of realising a Good, and end up with the representation of a wish as fulfilled. Starting as desire (indestructible *Wunsch*) in the unconscious, it ends up as the satisfaction, first and foremost of the wish to sleep, but also, as Lacan points out, as a satisfaction of a purely verbal kind. This means the wish is cast in the indicative perfect: a wish already fulfilled whether one likes it or not.

A dream is only successful, however, if it follows the Primary Process (which aims at identity of perception) rather than the Secondary one which strives for identity of thought. In order to stay within the Pleasure Principle, in which the subject can extract

pleasure from the jouissance of ciphering by achieving consciousness of an aspect of the Good, he must, on the one hand be preserved from external stimuli which would pull him across into reality on the right hand side of the diagram, and, on the other hand, he must get past or across reality, in the form of thought. The Dream work does this by means of condensation rather than metaphor. As an orientation it would go from the Real to the Imaginary through the Symbolic.

This involves the kind of topographical regression from *Wort* to Ding which Freud discussed in relation to the question of consciousness in dreams (perhaps also in his lost paper on Consciousness), and in 1915 (Supplement to Theory of Dreams) he distinguished this kind of regression, from thought to perception, from that occurring in psychosis, where word presentations seem divorced from object presentations and as much subject to the Primary Process as thing presentations. It is easy to see from the diagram, that the looser the knot which binds the two principles, the easier it is for perception, which is real, to come under the sway of the Pleasure Principle and create conditions for a hallucinatory realisation (perception) of the Good. In a dream, on the other hand, the fact that a wish can become conscious as sense perception and meet with belief in the reality of its fulfilment is possible, for Lacan, because one aspect of reality is purely verbal, that is, it is a question of signs attached to *Vorstellungen* which reality as such need not honour. This is wishful thinking.

On this model, dream analysis is the exact reverse of dreaming. It moves from the known (manifest) to the unknown (latent) to the unknowable (navel). In other words, metaphor rather than condensation is at play. As an orientation, it would go from the Imaginary by means of the Symbolic to the Real. Contrary to the dream, any "effect of the subject" is not possession of the Good but the question mark in the top right hand corner.⁷

Dream analysis operates a complete reversal in relation to dreaming. It goes against the grain of pleasure and is as dialectical as the relations between pleasure and reality can be - witness Lacan's description of Freud implicating the subject Dora in her reality. (Intervention on Transference, 1951). If wish-fulfilment implies a closing of the Unconscious, dream analysis aims at opening it: associations are called up to help re-translate the dream images into thoughts which try to say something about the Real. As Pierre-Gilles Guegen once pointed out, wish-fulfilment could, (and does as wish to sleep) imply the wish to give up on one's desire. Analysis opens up the lack which provokes desire.

Other Principles.

This elementary diagram further illustrates some basic psychoanalytic principles. Fundamentally, free association appears there as an artifice designed to bring thoughts (Reality) as much as possible under the influence of Pleasure, of the unconscious *bahnungen* which vehicle desire as indestructible. At the same time, this lure of homeostasis is countered by the fact that speech is also effort and articulates thought as reality. The paradoxical injunction of the fundamental rule effects both while bypassing the bar of Censorship between unconscious and preconscious by shifting its emphasis from content to form: "You're free to say what you like on condition that you don't omit anything". This latter is impossible and it leaves the subject free only to deceive or to temporise, before confronting a lack. It is then up to the analyst to pick up what the analysand repeats despite himself. This is possible because pleasure at the level of the unconscious is a pure repetition of signs (*Wahrnehmungszeichen*) which are signs of the Good, just as at the level of the ego, pleasure consists in repeating what will produce a sign of love. Identity of thought, on

the other hand, involves repetition of signifiers in language, and will produce an effect of the subject.

II.

Dream Construction.

At the time of Dora and the publication of the Interpretation of Dreams, Freud maintained that dream analysis was identical to the resolution of a hysterical symptom, both proceeding in reverse chronological order by accounting for all possible determinants until the traumatic kernel or repressed idea was delineated. To recapitulate Freud's argument: a dream is a compromise between the wish to sleep and the wish to achieve satisfaction as representation, which is another way of describing desire, because desire for Freud, finds its issue in achieving representation (or in Lacan's Hegelian reading: recognition - the desire to have one's desire recognised).

So in any dream we have, the modification of the "latent" , but preconscious dream thought(s), into a "dream wish" which is also pre-conscious and already different from the preconscious "day residues" which serve as its support. It is this dream wish which is hijacked by the bit of unconscious desire and comes to "represent" this latter in both the everyday material and the latent dream thought. This modification of the day residues, dream thoughts and unconscious desire into a new entity, the wish fulfilling dream, is effected, both with a view to "considerations of representability", as well as the need to bypass censorship, by means of the "dream work" which follows the law of overdetermination, that is, the most economical relation between the manifest and the latent, using the mechanisms of condensation and displacement.

Freud noted the ingenious part played by day residues: they are indifferent because they have few ties as yet to repressed material, and this eases the bypassing of Censorship, but also recent because this facilitates transference; in other words, they can borrow their intensity from the unconscious wish. Less clear is the relation between the latent dream thought and the unconscious wish which is always a wish formed in childhood, if indeed, Freud does not designate the same thing with either: perhaps, rather than seeing this thought as somehow preceding the dream in actuality, it should be seen as doing so in virtuality, while only existing as an effect of interpretation, that is, following the principle of *nachtraglichkeit* like any utterance. It would then be the only way of giving body to this childhood wish as rational, that is, as Freud stresses, using speech to articulate something real. The latent dream thought is then already an interpretation of desire. This is what Lacan says in Seminar XI: desire is interpretation.

The Problem of Registration.

What is the material the dream work operates on in terms of the signifying elements referred to earlier? There are at least four:

1. *Sach and Wort Vorstellungen*, any preconscious material, including day dreams, day residues, preoccupations. These are subject to distortion and conversion into rebus-like images.

2. Perceptions, material which, unlike 1., has not been processed by thought. These *Wahremungszeichen* Lacan takes to be signifiers too. Strachey calls them "indications of perception" (like indications of reality). Whatever escapes thought, Freud says, is subject to topographical regression, where even words can, as in Artaud's theatre of cruelty, be treated as things.

3. Memories of things or of the Thing. These are *Vorstellungen*, or ideas, which gravitate around the place of the missing 'Ding', and vehicle desire. Perhaps Freud situated "conceptual memories" at this level⁸. Insofar as they escape connection with *Wort Vorstellungen*, they are objects of inference and reconstruction, rather than material for analysis. The defense of the subject at this level is avoidance (*Vermeidung*) rather than repression.

4. Finally, the kind of signifier which is the object of repression: these are both the "memories of experience", and the so-called *Vorstellungsrepräsentanzen*, the representatives in consciousness of the drive. Freud says that this signifier is responsible for attracting word presentations in thought down to the level of unconscious thing presentations. It is instrumental in both regression and repression, where regression is the opposite of the lifting of repression. It is less clear whether this signifier is also the same as the representative in the dream wish of desire as unconscious. At any rate, it is something that seems to move in both the preconscious and the unconscious, which is not surprising considering Freud conceived it as the link between psyche and soma. We could call it a "key" signifier, by analogy of the *Schlüssel* neuron Freud delineates in the Project.

Drive Representatives.

Lacan, in the Direction of the Treatment... reminds us that desire, not the drive, is articulated in a dream. But in another context, Jacques Alain Miller, points out that between the subject and his desire comes the drive⁹. Moreover, it is a drive which impels the subject beyond the Pleasure Principle. For Freud the very nucleus of the unconscious is made up of drive representatives, the collective name for which is Id. In Subversion of the Subject... Lacan says "the *Vorstellungsrepräsentanz* is in its place in the Unconscious where it causes the desire of the subject following the structure of the fantasy". Again in Seminar XI¹⁰, the object cause of desire and the drive object are the same thing, and desire only turns round it in so far as it acts by means of it. As a "key" signifier it involves the relation between desire and enjoyment. And how can one forget that between desire and *jouissance*, at any moment in the practice, comes love, transference love, since, notoriously, this led Freud astray with Dora? Jacques-Alain Miller discusses all three in his paper The Labyrinth of Love. Here the question remains: do the two aspects of the unconscious, called somatic and semantic, have equal weight in dreams or is only one of these present, as Jung thought, for example, going as far as making the semantic mantic? Perhaps the drive signifier is the only thread leading to desire as unconscious, to the relations between those memories of things, *Vorstellungen*, which will never again add up to one Thing.

Dream Analysis.

The interpretation of dreams, then, would separate the pretext from the text, the actual day residues and other memories from the wishful thought, insofar as this wishful thought is not a daydream (though these too can enter the composition of the manifest dream), but articulates desire as soon as the subject speaks of it, meaning, as soon as the subject makes an effort to approach the navel of the dream. It operates the division of what belongs to the residue of reality as preconscious and the residue of what belongs to the unconscious as real - aiming at the cause of desire. Just as the dreamer follows the rule of free association in speaking about his dream, the interpreter follows the rule of isolating the signifier rather than the signification, supporting desire rather than responding to demand. As it is the signifier of the drive which is subject to repression, the analyst knows he can return as much in a dream as in a symptom, and hence will not neglect to use the dream where appropriate as

itself an interpretation of a problem to which the symptom is a particular solution, as Freud does with Dora.

Dora's Dream.

What can we see looking at Dora's first dream? There is no striking evidence of displacement in the sense of distortion, nor "secondary revision" reshaping the dream in the form of a day dream, so one could go straight to the points of condensation which are to be found in the words from father "I refuse to sacrifice my two children for the sake of your jewelcase". This is the nodal point which is not exhausted by subtraction of what belongs to day residues and other associations, the point therefore, which is most overdetermined and at which the unconscious wish could best achieve representation. If displacement is a manoeuvre for carrying the precious object round the enemy line of Censorship while facilitating condensation, this latter is a way of constructing the wish itself, of giving body to it, of making it a set. It can do this either by union, constructing a new unity from elements from other sets, or by intersection, only selecting the elements other sets have in common. Thus "jewel case" refers both to Dora's mother's great liking for jewels and to Herr K.'s gift of a jewel case to herself. But intersection can also leave out the common element, represent it by its conspicuous absence, for instance, in our example, whatever father and Herr K. have in common in the situation of standing by her bedside other than waking her.

If the words of father represent a wish of Dora's as fulfilled, what is it? Since the wish or thought is preconscious, it is very much open to interpretation. We could argue, for example, that Herr K. also refused to sacrifice his two children, with whom Dora was intimate, ie. he did not wish to divorce Frau K. If we can substitute him for Father because of the bedside scene recalled by Dora in her associations, then we could also substitute Frau K. for her mother, and arrive at a preconscious wish which Dora expressed all the time: that her father stop sacrificing her for the sake of Frau K. Or we could recall that prior to Herr K. it was Frau K. who refused to divorce her husband on the same grounds, for the sake of the two children. Then Frau K. would be in the place of the one saying "I refuse to sacrifice..." and Dora would be harking back to the wish of not being sacrificed by, rather than for, the object of her desire, Frau K.

Moreover, since "two children" are the object of sacrifice for everybody, in other words, Dora uses the K. children as much as the K.s use her, the wish could also indicate Dora addressing Herr K. (who had given her the jewel case) from the position of husband or lover of Frau K., in other words, supported by her identification with her father, and so become the wish to undo Herr K.'s breaking of the compliant structure in the scene by the lake.

No doubt that analysis could reveal to both analysand and analyst which reading, which latent thoughts, carried more weight. But do any of them touch on the mark of the unconscious wish, on Dora's desire? Perhaps this would remain undecidable, unless one were also to touch on the place of her enjoyment.

Freud knew that Dora had her "secret" and any attempt to uncover it would need to tie the dream thoughts back to the kind of symptomatic act of the scene by the lake. Lacan, again in Seminar VII, thought that a hysterical attack reproduces something of the original trauma, but in a rather ambiguous manner. It reproduces pleasure, certainly, but centred on the Thing as support for disgust, for desire as unsatisfied. Is it possible to isolate a signifier in Dora's slapping of Herr K. which supports such "unsatisfaction"? Very much so: "My wife is nothing to me". In the dream, saying "I refuse to sacrifice..." is another way of saying, You are not worth it -, whereas the idea

of highest value attached to “jewel” is the exact reverse of “nothing”.

Digression on Nothing.

It would then be possible to see this “nothing to me” as pointing to the place of the Thing, possible to see it as one signifier of the drive, something that can be taken up in a chain of thought and repressed as the memory of an “experience”. For Lacan such a signifier also regulates the subject’s distance from *Das Ding*. It is further possible to hypothesise this experience as being the traumatic one, one which is only made sense of *après coup*, linked as it is to a perception of parental enjoyment. As it happens, Father’s relation to Mother is “I get nothing out of my wife”.

At this point it is important to remember the Proton Pseudos, the lie of the hysteric at the level of the unconscious. For Lacan this is precisely the symptom, where this symptom is the only possible defence against the fact that the Thing, in the unconscious, is also a “bad object”. It is bad because at that level it is only reflected as Law, as an oracle, a command which has no guarantee, which, most importantly, can be inconsistent, in other words, can harbour *jouissance*. This potential inconsistency of the Other’s desire, the fact that in the place of the Other of the Other there is only the Thing, that the subject is not only the object cause of desire as unsatisfied, the pivotal point of an intrigue, but also the object of desire *tout court*, as satisfiable, that is what the hysteric does not want to know about, that is the position to which Dora found herself reduced in the scene by the lake when Herr K. eliminated himself as support for her identification with him. “Nothing to me”, as representation of Dora’s relation to the real of *jouissance*, because it disgusts her or dissatisfies her, means that she wants to be nothing as object of the other’s desire, but therefore of inestimable value at the level of the object cause of desire, like a jewel. In other words, she wants to be herself the guarantee of the desire of the Other as consistent.

Truth.

Herr K.’s “nothing to me” had the effect of exposing the lie as symptom, by means of which, Lacan continues, the subject tells the truth. This is the truth as place, a place occupied by an (a) in Lacan’s later formulation of the “discourse of the hysteric”, where it supports the questioning and barred subject \$ who doesn’t want to know anything about what is in that place, especially when it can blame S₂, the knowledge produced in response to her “secret” by the master, S₁, she has taken as addressee, as impotent.

\$	S ₁
—	—
a	S ₂

Another aspect of this lie is, Nothing to me, but perhaps something to another woman. Perhaps the Other woman has knowledge of the unspeakable Thing, harbours the secret of femininity. Castration is masked in this move which conceals the truth that at the level of the unconscious, where there ought to be a signifier of femininity, there is nothing. In other words, not only does this lie conceal the truth that there is something of value, even if only accessible to another woman, but even more, it conceals the truth, in a manner similar to the galician Jew at the railway station in the story quoted by both Freud and Lacan, that there truly is nothing behind this value, that there is no sexual rapport. There is only a barred subject.

Sacrifice.

The symptomatic act showed the truth concerning Dora's desire as unsatisfied desire, for the moment Frau K. chose satisfaction, dropped her in favour of her father, and the moment this father showed inconsistency, by not being altogether impotent, i.e.. the moment Frau K. no longer supported Dora's question of how a woman can love a man who cannot satisfy her, she began her complaint, complaint about the bad object, the improper relations.

We can picture this on the diagram. Frau K.'s "adorable white body" no longer filled the place of the Good and so Dora's perception. Instead of the object of desire, there appeared, on the other side, the question mark, the question of the object cause of desire, specifically, the place she occupied in the desire of the others. In analysis with Freud, she spoke from the Good, become bad, via perception rather than thought, producing a knowledge inflected by the unconscious wish for her old Good, knowledge which Freud challenged by following the path back via thought, painstakingly, not only implicating her in reality therefore, operating the famous dialectical reversal, but also moving her in the direction of the question mark, rather than her old Good.

Interestingly, Dora's complaint was also a complaint against phallic enjoyment. If, in Lacan's words, the phallus is that living part of oneself which has become a signifying function, which has been sacrificed, symbolically, to Logos, we can situate one aspect of the hysterical "strike" in relation to phallic enjoyment in the way the sacrifice to Logos is inverted: Florence Nightingale¹¹, for example, sacrifices, instead, her position in society (a representative of Logos), which not only has the effect of producing herself as a reject, as an (a) cause of desire, but also to be herself a phallic apparition, an "angel in a wicked world".

Desire.

To return to the argument, we can summarise it as follows: desire is neither exhausted by the demand for love which wish fulfilment stages, nor satisfied in the specific action acted by the drive. But, on the one hand, exhaustive analysis of the dream thoughts conditioning the wish allow one to locate the object of desire in reality, and on the other hand, exposure of the part of satisfaction in the symptom as a compromise (of desire and drive, unconscious and id, we could say), allows one to glimpse the lack in which the object cause of desire operates. In both cases, the signifier of the drive functions like a "point de capiton" in relation to the fundamentally metonymic nature of desire so often stressed by Lacan. It gives an indication of desire insofar as it is the desire of the Other, both because it captures and fixes the memory of an experience, and because this experience, which is traumatic in analysis, is precisely an encounter with the desire of the Other.

This leaves, on the one hand, the structure of the fantasy, which supports both desire and the symptom, and, on the other hand, desire itself as an enigma. Perhaps it is not surprising, then, that Lacan conceives interpretation, not only as a quotation, somewhat like the words in Dora's first dream, but also as an enigma (Seminar XVII). To the navel of the dream corresponds what Jacques-Alain Miller has called the x of the analyst's desire, which allows him to redefine desire as a question on desire.

Nowhere is this question more in evidence than in Dora's second dream, where the very typographical mark of the question appears after the questioning of her desire by an Other whose desire causes her problems: Mother's (and in associations, Frau K.'s) "If you like?", a question which, supported by the dead father ("now he's dead"), whose law allows its articulation, refers us back, not only to the question in reality, in the top right hand corner of the diagram, but to the *Che vuoi?*, the great graph of

desire with which Lacan summarised the first decade of his teaching.

END NOTES:

¹ In the first third of Seminar VII. Now that a translation (Denis Porter) has appeared on these shores, my attempted exposition of this third loses some of its exegetory necessity.

² Richard Klein has developed this notion.

³ Instinct as a hypothesis, since any subject only experiences a “drive”.

⁴ Letter 52 to Fliess.

⁵ Idem.

⁶ The Unconscious. 1915.

⁷ One could put the object cause of desire in this place, but only if the topology becomes three dimensional and one imagines this place linking up again with the UnCs. in the opposite corner.

⁸ Letter 52 to Fliess.

⁹ Éxtimité. 1982

¹⁰ The fullest account is there given of the drive signifier in relation to alienation and separation.

¹¹ V. Palomera has written a fascinating paper on the Lady of the Lamp as Grande Hystérique. Cfar newsletter.