Freud’s major contribution on homosexuality is contained in his Leonardo paper of 1910, which followed a discussion of the subject in more general terms in Three Essays on Sexuality (Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie) of 1905. The views expressed in the first essay, which he titled The Sexual Aberrations (Die Sexuellen Abirrungen), are carried into the study of Leonardo and are further developed there. Furthermore, the real importance of the Three Essays does not lie with the actual text but with the long footnote which maps out Freud’s progressive thinking on the subject of homosexuality between 1910 and 1920. The footnote consists of three additions (Zusätze): 1910, 1915, 1920. The first addition is a brief reiteration of his analysis of Leonardo. The 1915 paragraph sets out to state that “psychoanalytic research is most decidedly opposed to any attempt at separating homosexuals from the rest of mankind as a group of a special character.” Freud continues by stressing that “psychoanalysis considers that a choice of an object independently of its sex — freedom to range equally over male and female objects — as it is found in childhood, in primitive states of society and early periods of history, is the original basis from which, as a result of restriction in one direction or the other, both the normal and the inverted types develop.” But this rather progressive statement is rolled back again only a few sentences later: “In inverted types, a predominance of archaic constitutions and primitive psychical mechanisms is regularly to be found. Their most essential characteristics seem to be a coming into operation of narcissistic object-choice and a retention of the erotic significance of the anal zone.”

The 1920s addition to the footnote deals with Freud’s acknowledgement of Ferenczi’s contribution to the subject. He praises Ferenczi for stressing the importance of making a distinction between subject-homo-erotics ‘who feel and behave like women’ and object-homo-erotics ‘who are completely masculine and who have merely exchanged a female for a male object’. While Freud welcomes Ferenczi’s distinction, he indicates that he prefers to think that the majority of homosexuals are mixed types (Mischtypen): “While granting the existence of these two types, we may add that there are many people in whom a certain quantity of subject homo-eroticism is found in combination with a proportion of object homo-eroticism.”

After this rather important footnote-reference, which grants us an insight into Freud’s thinking on homosexuality over a time span of 15 years, I now want to direct your interest back to the Leonardo paper published in 1910, and which should be regarded as the most comprehensive study which he undertook in mapping out his theoretical views on homosexuality.

Let me begin by trying to reconstruct Freud’s theory on homosexuality from the Leonardo text. Freud develops his theory on homosexuality out of his theoretical thinking on infantile sexuality. There he points out that the child’s sexual curiosity (Wissbegierde) is driven and ‘dominated’ by the paramount interest in his own genitals. Since he regards this part of his body as very precious and important, the child is led to believe that the people around him are equally equipped. In a further step, the child deduces from his first assumption that everybody must have a penis, since he is unable to realise that there exists another type of ‘genital structure of
equal worth. This preconception is not even jeopardised when he first observes the genitals of girls. However, he concludes from that observation that there ‘is something different from what he has got’. But Freud thinks him incapable of acknowledging to himself what he has observed, that he cannot find the penis of the girl. The idea that the penis is missing becomes an uncanny and unbearable proposition for the boy in Freud’s elaboration. He claims that the child finds a ‘workable compromise’ in telling himself that the girl has got a penis, but it is very small and has yet to grow. When the boy realises that his theory does not work out, he looks for another possible way out by suggesting to himself that the girl’s penis has been cut off, leaving her with a wound in its place. According to Freud, this assumption by the little boy already incorporates his own experience of being threatened by adults, and his fear that the ‘so-dear-to-him’ object is going to be taken away from him unless he stops showing too great an interest in it. This impending danger, Freud concludes, forces the boy to re-evaluate his thinking. The danger of castration makes him tremble for his manhood. And Freud believes that concurrently he — in a reassessment of the female genitals — comes to despise the unfortunate creatures who — in the boy’s opinion — have already been subjected to the cruel punishment.

Freud employs the just-developed psychic structure further to advance his theory on the psychic origin of homosexuality. For that, he goes back to before the castration complex, to a time — as he considers it — when the woman was still regarded as equal by the boy. He describes that time as a period of intensive exhibitionism which he regards as the signification of the erotic drive being at work. This exhibitionism coincides in his opinion with an intense desire to see the genitals of other people, in order, he assumes, to compare them with his own. Wrapped up in the erotic aura of the mother, he responds by wanting to see her genitals which he thinks will be like his. When later he comes to realise that the woman does not have a penis, his desire for it turns into nausea, which according to Freud becomes in puberty the cause for ‘psychic impotence and misogyny, which can manifest itself as permanent homosexuality.”

Freud finds his hypothesis verified in his research on homosexual men, who all seem to have experienced an intensive erotic bond to a female person in early childhood, normally the mother. In Freud’s opinion the attachment is often encouraged by the woman, the mother, through an ‘over-indulgence’ (Überzärtlichkeit) on her side which corresponds to a position of emotional reserve from the side of the father. As a result Freud sees the boy subjected (preisgegeben) to the influence of the woman. However, Freud states that eventually the affection and tenderness poured out by the mother fall victim to repression due to the boy’s psychic development. And now comes Freud’s decisive move. He assumes that the boy represses his affection for the mother by taking her position. What, according to Freud, takes place now is that the boy identifies with the mother, and his own person becomes the prototype which serves as a matrix for the choice of the objects of his desire. This has made him homosexual in Freud’s view. He follows up those stipulations with some qualifying remarks. There he comes to regard homosexuality as a regression into auto-eroticism, because the boys he desires are, as he puts it, Ersatzpersonen or ‘revivals’ (Erneuerungen) of the memory of himself as being abundantly loved by the mother. That is the moment where Freud introduces narcissism, which had its first short outing only months before in the first addition to the footnote to ‘Sexuelle Abirrungen’ which I mentioned above. He defines narcissism as a desiring subject which chooses his object of desire as the mirror image of himself.
Now follows the verification process of his theory and we have finally arrived at the heart of our discourse: Leonardo da Vinci. Freud begins by remarking that very little is known about Leonardo’s childhood and youth. We can regard as an established fact that he was born illegitimately in Vinci near Florence in 1452. His father, Piero da Vinci, was a notary like many of his ancestors. His mother’s name was Caterina and Freud thinks she was a peasant girl. The next detail known comes from a document dating from 1457 which lists Leonardo amongst the members of Piero da Vinci’s household. Freud interprets the entry as Leonardo having been taken in by his father since his marriage to Donna Albiera had remained childless. One does not know when Leonardo left the house of his father to become an apprentice at an art studio. With the entry of Leonardo’s name in a catalogue of artists in 1472, his life became well documented.

The very limited material Freud has to go by, however, is supplemented by a fragment of childhood memory which Leonardo inserts in the unlikely place of a scientific dissertation. There, while he speaks of the flight technique of a vulture, he suddenly interrupts his scientific exposition and narrates a very personal memory: “......while I was in my cradle, a vulture came down to me, and opened my mouth with its tail and struck me many times with its ‘tail’ ‘against’ (later corrected by Freud to ‘between’) my lips.” Freud begins his interpretation by emphasising the erotic-sexual symbolism of the tail as a synonym for the penis. The act in which the tail (Schwanz/Glied) pushes itself into the mouth of the child and moves round in it vigorously signifies for Freud fellatio. He points out that this phantasy, which indicates a passive position within the sexual act, is to be found mostly in the dreams of women and homosexuals. He further adds that the situation just described is a re-working (Umarbeitung) of an older and more familiar universally known experience which “once gave us pleasure, comfort and most of all nourishment: the suckling on the mother’s breast.”

Questioning the phantasy for its real content, Freud comes to the conclusion that the substitution of the mother for the vulture indicates that the child found itself with its mother and missed its father. Thus Freud argues that when he entered the house of his father and stepmother, his psychic formation had already been put in place by his enforced exclusive relation with his real mother Caterina. Freud goes on to state that this physical and psychic relation will determine his reaction towards the outside world.

We will by-pass Freud’s digression into Egyptian mythology, which was intended to further strengthen his argument, because of the well-known translation error in the referential sources. Nibbio, the Italian for kite, was wrongly translated into ‘Geier’ the German for vulture by M. Herzfeld (1906) as was the term in Freud’s main source, Mereschkowski’s fictionalised account of Leonardo. What was correctly called kite (korshun) there in the Russian text became, again, vulture in the German translation.

Hence, for the moment, we want to overlook this problem and follow Freud in applying his infantile sexual theory to the case of Leonardo. Freud’s hypothesis of the intimate relation between mother and child as the potential condition for a later developing homosexuality is confirmed to him by the smile of the Mona Lisa which to him conveys ‘the promise of a boundless abundance of tenderness’. To Freud, the smile of the Mona Lisa del Giocondo brought back to Leonardo the memory of his mother and her tenderness for him which is captured in the picture. Speaking of the
tender bond between Leonardo and his mother, he points to the grave consequences (Verhängnis) that the great affection — as is illustrated by the ‘Geierphantasie’ which speaks of the intensity of the infatuation (Liebkosung) — was to cause. Being deserted by her lover, her tenderness for the son, in Freud’s view, was partially generated by her memory of the tenderness of her lover and her longing for a new one. Thus he concludes that the child had to deal with a barrage of tenderness engendered by the mother’s own loss of received tenderness, added to her desire to compensate for the absence of the father’s love for the child. As a result, Freud sees the ‘completely unsatisfied mother’ install her son in the place of the lover and by that “robbed him — due to the too early maturing of his eroticism — of a part of his manhood.”

Moreover, Freud identifies in the transformation from sucking at the mother’s nipple to being sucked, a passivity which further indicates an ‘unequivocal’ (unzweifelhafte) homosexuality. However, to Freud all these criteria do not yet fully explain the complexity of Leonardo’s homosexuality, which Freud comes to define as an ideal, because sublimated, one. In order to fully grasp its particular quality, I shall briefly summarize the dialectic Freud sees between the infantile research into the origin of the species and its possible sublimation (Verdrängung) into a scientific pursuit of knowledge.

Freud places the desire for knowledge in the early infantile phase, often in connection with “the actual birth of a little brother or sister, or by a fear of it which is based on external experiences — in which the child perceives a threat to his selfish interests.” Feeling threatened in its exclusiveness to the parent(s), the child embarks on his research, so Freud thinks, to look “for ways and means to avert so undesired an event.” In Freud’s view, the child almost reaches a satisfactory conclusion but only almost. At the end of his research, he ‘has a notion’ (Ahnung) of the sexual act as something ‘hostile’ (feindselig) and ‘violent’ (gewaltätig) and suspects that the ‘father plays an obscure role’ in it. However, Freud surmises, since the child’s own sexual constitution has not reached the level of sexual maturation, his research comes to nothing. This results in a termination of the infantile sexual research by ‘a wave of energetic sexual repression’.

Contemplating the fate of the research drive, Freud suggests three possible types: The first is the neurotic inhibitional one, in which the research shares the fate of sexuality and becomes inhibited, consequently curiosity remains inhibited and the free activity of intelligence limited for life; in the second type the intellectual development resists sexual repression. After termination of the infantile sexual research, when the intelligence has grown, it recalls the old link and ‘offers its help in evading sexual repression’. This allows the suppressed sexual activities of research to return from the unconscious in the form of ‘compulsive brooding’. However, this thinking is ‘unfree’, according to Freud, for it is sexualised. Thinking is impregnated by the pleasure and anxiety that belong to the realm of sexuality proper. Research becomes a sexual activity and the feeling of gaining knowledge replaces sexual satisfaction. The third type, Freud suggests “escapes inhibition as well as neurotic compulsive thinking.” Instead, the libido avoids the destiny of being repressed and is sublimated into a desire for knowledge (Wissbegierde), attaching itself as a reinforcement to the powerful drive for knowledge. Like the second type, research becomes compulsive to a certain extent and Ersatz, for sexual activity. Yet it lacks the neurotic character, because it differs radically in the underlying psychical processes. While the second type is determined by an ‘eruption from the unconscious’, the last type is based on pure sublimation. This, according to Freud, is
possible because the association with the original complexes of infantile sexual research have been severed. Freud then goes on to state that the “sexual repression, which has made the instinct so strong through the addition of sublimated libido, is still taken into account by the instinct, in that it avoids any concern with sexual themes.”

For Freud, Leonardo becomes the tailor-made model (Musterfall) of the third type. He sees in Leonardo the concurrence of a powerful desire for knowledge, which correlates with the atrophy (Verkümmerung) of his sexual life, which, as Freud believes, was restricted to what he called ideal (sublimated) homosexuality.

Freud, looking for the secret force behind Leonardo’s work, comes to identify it in the artist’s ability to sublimate the curiosity which originally stood in the service of the infantile sexual research into a quest for knowledge. It is this realisation that Freud comes to regard as the core and the secret of Leonardo’s being.

Having introduced the fundamental theoretical concepts contained in the paper, I will now, in my critical appraisal of the dissertation, look into the question of the contemporary relevance of Freud’s theory. Furthermore, I would like to suggest that Freud’s Leonardo paper should be read as a ‘blueprint’ and ‘outline’ (Entwurf) of his professional and personal programme and being. I will further my argument by commenting on three key issues raised by the paper: Firstly, the theory on the origin of homosexuality; secondly, the notion of art as the result of sublimation and thirdly, the concept of the desire for knowledge (Wissbegierde). The discussion of those topics will, furthermore, provide me with an opportunity to introduce Freud’s paper in more detail.

Today, I will deal with the first term: Freud’s theory of the origin of homosexuality. Leading towards it, I would like to begin my discourse with a brief comment on the nibbio translation error controversy.

In the editorial preface note, Mitscherlich does not fail to point out the mistake and expresses his astonishment that only ‘very recently’ have critics seized on it. Consequently some of them, Mitscherlich remarks, have dismissed the paper altogether and he fears that some readers might feel likewise inclined. A reaction, Mitscherlich thinks, that is premature and unjustified. What he suggests, in order to ‘save’ the paper, is to overlook the passages and arguments which expressly build on Freud’s research into the origin of the vulture and its importance for an understanding of Leonardo’s phantasy. Foremost affected would be Freud’s discourse on the significance of the vulture and its origin in Egyptian mythology. In his preface Mitscherlich states: “The hieroglyph for the Egyptian word for ‘mother’ (‘mut’) quite certainly represents a vulture and not a kite.” He then admits that Freud’s theory that the bird of Leonardo’s phantasy stood for his mother cannot be verified by the Egyptian myth. Consequently he suggests that the part of the dissertation which is built around the vulture mistake has to be discarded, because of its ill-founded research. Despite that admission, he asserts: “Freud’s psychological analysis of the phantasy is not contradicted by this correction but merely deprived of one piece of corroborative support.” However, this and his additional remark that “the bird phantasy and the myth seem to have no immediate connection with each other” appear to overlook the fact that Freud, as the Leonardo paper documents, deduces the crucial first phase of his infantile sexual theory from his research into the Egyptian vulture myth. In chapter two, he concludes his research on the vulture myth with the assertion that the vulture was ‘revered as a symbol of motherhood’ (Mütterlichkeit) and that there were no males
of this species. Then, superimposing his theoretical insights on the Leonardo analysis, Freud undertakes to prove conclusively that, since Leonardo was well read\(^3\), he was familiar with the Egyptian myth, as he was with the knowledge that the deity ‘mut’ was androgynous and depicted with male and female sexual organs.\(^4\) Thus Freud has Leonardo’s memory emerge out of the pre-knowledge of the myth, which then neatly fits in with the androgynous mother of the infantile sexual theory, which was itself a conception of Freud’s archaeological research. Thus, in my view, the translation error has wider repercussions than are suggested by the editors. The vulture myth is intricately woven into Freud’s whole theory on the origin of homosexuality. Hence, to extract it, as is advocated by the editors, would in my opinion not only cripple Freud’s analysis of Leonardo’s homosexuality based on his childhood memory but, furthermore, put into question aspects of his infantile sexual theory.

Turning away from this controversy, I now want to argue that Freud had a ‘hidden’ agenda which drove him to write the Leonardo paper. The closer I got to the text the more I became intrigued by the felt presence of a hidden desire which energized his argument. I began wondering what aspect of the ‘great man’s’ character and accomplishments had corresponded to Freud’s desire. Was it Leonardo the Renaissance man; Leonardo the artist and scientist or Leonardo the homosexual, or all of them? Reading the text with those questions in mind, I became aware of a programme embedded in the paper, which in my opinion exceeded the case study based on a corrupted conscious memory fragment and its interpretation, which unfortunately had been built on an error.

Let me begin my argument by examining Freud’s presentation and subsequent analysis of Leonardo’s homosexuality. Thus I hope to assess Freud’s attitude and position towards homosexuality as such. What I want to do is to analyse Freud’s attitude to homosexuality by closely reading the Leonardo paper.

I found myself — while getting more and more familiar with the text — wondering how much of his analysis of Leonardo’s sexuality and life was based on concrete evidence and how much was the product of fiction. Freud, the reading revealed, moulded the historical figure into the protagonist of a novel fitting his design and purpose. Freud already anticipated this reaction by his reader when, in the concluding chapter of his paper, he remarks that his statements might draw criticism even from his friends within the psychoanalytical circle.\(^4\) Recalling another great psychologist and writer, Walter Benjamin, who in his reading of Marcel Proust and his novel\(^4\) lets his essay be the echo of the novel rather than its re-writing. However, examining Freud on Leonardo, I felt was reading Freud on Freud via the vehicle of Leonardo.

Thus I want to argue that, in writing on Leonardo, Freud pursued his well documented desire for scientific and social recognition for his work and, through it, for himself. We know that he was strongly criticised by the Viennese scientific establishment for his work. Furthermore, his social position was in constant jeopardy due to open and covert anti-semitism, a threat which, like other members of outsider groups, the Jew often tries to counter by overcompensation and exaggerated conformity to that which constantly attempts to eject him from its midst, (a notion I will return to). Against this background, I wondered if we could see Freud attempting to position himself and his work in line with the great and universally recognised scientist and artist, and imagining himself as his successor; the renaissance man of his epoch.
If, Freud were to assume the mantle of the idol, he had to deal with the great man’s sexuality. Since Freud’s work was intended as a theory of sexuality, Leonardo’s sexuality, especially because of its problematic nature, had to be tackled. The inventor of a theory of sexuality could not claim the mantle of somebody’s fame whose controversial sexuality had been hushed up by acolytes and critics alike without taking a position. So in dragging up Leonardo’s homosexuality Freud was well aware that he was going to be accused of baselessly throwing dirt at ‘the great man’. Hence Freud had the difficult task of dealing with Leonardo’s homosexuality while at the same time avoiding ‘tarnishing’ the image of the idol (Vorbild), an establishment figure, by identifying it too closely with a prohibited sexual practice.

Freud sets out to chart Leonardo’s purification process from his childhood, which was marked by his personal variation of ‘original sin’ in the form of an affliction which was due to a mother’s overindulgence, through sublimation, to the final state of unbounded creativity. Freud’s presentation reminds one of hagiography, in its attempt to whitewash the pre-sainthood existence by setting the fruits of his divine calling against the moral failing which dominated his sinful existence. In Leonardo’s case, this means that the sexual drive, in Freud’s design, is ‘atrophied’ (verkümmert) to an ideal, a sublimated homosexuality which opens the way for Leonardo to be reborn as the artist and researcher through the intervention of sublimation.

However, I would like to argue that Freud’s reading has to be analysed against the historical context in which it was formulated. I would claim that such an analysis would show very clearly a society’s obsession with sexuality in its representation: the sexual act which had stifled itself through its self imposed moral restrictions and Puritanism and as a result had removed the sexual act from practice into the realm of phantasy and projection. Judeo-Christian law had succeeded in placing a taboo on sexuality; except for the sexual act which was performed in the service of procreation. Outside that, it was regarded as jeopardizing civilisation itself (as I will discuss in more detail in a moment) and, furthermore, was counterproductive to the rise of the Kulturmenschen, who was that rare and aspired-to species which had ‘freed’ itself from what Freud calls ‘its common animalistic desires’. However, I will have to sidestep the topic of sublimation and return to the task in hand.

The question of Leonardo’s homosexuality was most problematic for Freud and his time. It would have been inconceivable for Freud and the society of which he desired to be an integral part to recognise Leonardo as a homosexual who practised and identified with his sexuality. Such an attempt would have put into question the prevailing moral code and, moreover, raised the question of society and its attitude towards homosexuality and homosexual practice. Hence Freud, not wanting to rock the boat, had to preserve the image of the ‘great man’ and ‘pure artist’. Does the fact, reiterated in his analysis and implied anyway, that Leonardo never committed the homosexual act, thus open the way for himself to ‘succeed’ the renaissance genius? Is this why Freud, remarking on the sexual drive in Leonardo the artist and scientist, states that it does not amount to more than “traces of untransformed sexual inclination”? A statement which he reiterates when he speaks of the absence of sexual activity from Leonardo’s life: “A high degree of sexual activity is not to be attributed to him.”

So when Freud comes to explain Leonardo’s entourage of beautiful boys, he cannot but describe Leonardo’s relation to them as motherly. “He treated them with kindness and consideration, looked after them, and when they were ill, nursed them
himself, just as a mother nurses her children and just as his own mother might have tended him." He goes on to describe his association with the 'young people' as 'tender' (the same adjective as he uses to describe Caterina's relation to her son) and emphasises that the master-apprentice relation "did not culminate in sexual activities."

However, a casual remark suggests a different interpretation. In it, Freud speaks of Leonardo being denounced for involvement in homosexual activity in his youth at the time of his apprenticeship. It could be suggested that the trauma of being exposed and charged for an act which was not only prohibited but stigmatised would have affected the way in which the young man would have cared to conduct his sexual activities after this unfortunate incident. However, one could suggest that like other victims of homophobia throughout its age-old history, he would have 'wised up' in his sexual conduct and would have adopted a policy of utmost discretion due to his 'brush' with the law. Thus Freud, in his reading of Leonardo's relations with his 'beautiful boys', again, due to his programme, seems to impose instead of reveal.

Why did Leonardo choose to surround himself with handsome young boys who were not always 'handsome' on the 'inside', as mentioned in the margins of his diary, where he describes one of them (Jacomo) as 'thievish, untruthful, selfish (and) greedy'. One possible explanation would be that sexual lust cares very little for the social pedigree and moral standing of its object of desire. Again, Proust can provide us with an example: Baron Charlus, one of the most distinguished members of French aristocracy, 'descends' for his sexual pleasures to a sleazy low class brothel far away from the social glitter of the Parisian high society. There, Proust tells us, he would look amongst workmen, mercenaries and criminals for his sexual partners, who would chain him to a bed and spank him. In order to heighten his sexual pleasure, he would urge his sexual partners to recount their most depraved sexual exploits.

If we employ a more Platonic approach, we would look at his 'little band' of handsome young boys as 'inspiration'. A notion discussed, for instance, in the closing speech of the Symposium. There, Alicibiades recounts to the dinner guests how one night he had "wrapped his cloak round Socrates and taken him into his arms and had lain there all night with......the man." Next morning, he continues, "he had got up and he had no more slept with Socrates, within the meaning of the act, than if he'd been my father or elder brother."

For Socrates, divine beauty is located in the Other and it can only be accessed through 'the mystery of love'. A love which is resonating in the erotic tension ignited and fuelled by the mutual appreciation of physical beauty. It seems very likely that Leonardo enjoyed such homoerotic relationships with his young men and, as Socrates described, the physical beauty of the young man became the gateway through which he gazed at the infinite Other, and of which his art was to give an account. But the erotic relationship cannot be maintained for ever. The erotic tension demands release. So when Plato 'lays down the law' on love of boys in the Third Book of the Republic, he prohibits 'the kissing and touching' of the young man in any other way but as 'is the custom between father and son'. However, the fact that such guidance had to be issued, and inscribed on the tablets of the law, proves that the reality on which it was to be imposed was very different. It was Plato's ideal intention to freeze, through the law, that moment of erotic tension. A notion worthy of his Republic. A state beyond desire. Plato knew full well that the erotic tension would inevitably retranslate into physical attraction which desired release in the sexual act
and thus terminate the mutual erotic affinity. This does not jeopardize the Platonic maxim of the ‘non-encounter’ with the other in the erotic relation but is its condition. It is dialectically essential, for its ‘existence’ is verified in its decay, its consumption. Kierkegaard understood this dialectic of the non-encounter with the Other in the erotic relation which appears through its disappearance in the sexual. The Diary of the Seducer is testimony. The culminating sexual encounter towards which both Johannes and Cordellia live and desire is reported in a few brief sentences. The main part of the novel is taken up with the account of erotic tension which drives the lovers towards each other. Kierkegaard’s poetry succeeds in conveying to us that the non-encounter (the unconscious non-violent communion) with the Other in the erotic embrace is beyond the grasp of signification and is experienced only in its loss.

Let me just make some final remarks on Freud’s conjecture of Leonardo’s absence of interest in sex. He does this by drawing our attention to a sketch by Leonardo depicting the anatomy of the sexual act. Freud, in a footnote added in 1917 and quoting from an unspecified publication by R. Reitler, finds proof of Leonardo’s repressed sexuality in an imprecise and lacklustre anatomical sketch. Speaking of the woman’s breast, Freud points out that it is “flabby and hangs down unpleasingly” and, furthermore, is anatomically incorrect. But more interesting still is his interpretation of the facial expression of what Freud describes as the ‘male head with feminine characteristics’: “...the features.... are marked by a resistance that is positively indignant. His brows are wrinkled and his gaze is directed sideways with an expression of repugnance.” And he continues: “The lips are pressed together....In this face can be seen neither the pleasure of love’s blessings nor the happiness of indulgence: it expresses only indignation and aversion.”

Again, as with the vulture incident, Freud’s conclusion is already factually ill-founded, as the editorial appendix reveals. The anatomical drawing under discussion here, which Freud assumed to be by Leonardo, was in fact a reproduction of a lithograph by Wehrt, which was published in 1830 and which in turn was the copy of an engraving by Bartolozzi, who published it in 1812. Bartolozzi had added the feet — which Freud had alluded to as ‘the clumsiest blunder’ (Fehlleistung) of the whole sketch. Wehrt had added the sour expression to the face. The correction goes on to say that the original Leonardo drawing — held, as it still is, at Windsor Castle — showed the man’s head with a calm and neutral expression, a posture appropriate for an anatomical sketch. A fact, however, missed by Freud.

Furthermore, when he comments on Leonardo drawing the coitus in a standing position (Geschlechtsakt im Stehen) he comes to the following conclusion: “We must surely suppose that there was a sexual repression of quite special strength to have caused it to be represented in this...almost grotesque way.” And he continues, not realising that he is dealing with an anatomical drawing rather than a painting expressing subjectivity: “If one wants to enjoy oneself, it is usual to make oneself as comfortable as possible......and it is normal in coitus today to lie down....Lying down implies more or less a wish to stay in the desired situation for some time.” What Freud is doing here is to abstract from what was ‘normal’ bourgeois sexual practice of his time and give it universal validity. Yet, as we all know, and as it has been throughout man’s history, sexuality can be enjoyed in infinite positions which don’t necessarily require the horizontal. Concerning homosexual practice, partly due to its prohibition and partly as an enhancement of the thrill which comes with the randomness, evanescence and anonymity of the encounter, it is probably more often enjoyed outside the confines of the bed than in.
Next, I want to argue that Freud’s theory of the origin of homosexuality is more a reflection of his time and culture than a genuine insight into the genesis of homosexuality. This becomes clear when — keeping in mind Freud’s theory that homosexuality is caused through a too affectionate (zärtlich) mother/son relationship — we want to look, again, at homosexuality in ancient Greece but his time from a different perspective.

Employing Freud’s theory, we would have to come to the conclusion that ancient Greek society was dominated by castrating women (Mann-Weiber) and weak or absent fathers. We immediately realise that such a proposition will not explain the phenomenon of the wide homoerotic and homosexual practice common amongst the Greeks of antiquity which is well documented in literature and art. It becomes quickly obvious that here we have a culture which did not place sanctions on homosexuality because it did not feel threatened by it. On the contrary, as we saw earlier, homoerotic relations were regarded as, for instance, a source which inspired philosophy and poetry and as Thucydides in The Peloponnesian War tells us, was ‘the secret weapon’ in the ancient Greek military and strategic arsenal.

We find a different situation in Islamic cultures, which I would like to present as further evidence against Freud’s origin theory. In Islamic law, homosexual acts are prohibited yet they are widely practised. The cause of widespread homosexuality, again, is rooted not in a particular mother/son relation but in the inaccessibility of the female sex for the unmarried male. Like Christian law, Islamic law prohibits sexual intercourse between the sexes before marriage. This is further complicated by the man’s insistence on marrying a virgin. Furthermore, marriage involves financial provisions and obligations for the man which he often finds difficult to meet in economically poor societies where wealth is reflected in the number of wives. An absence of wealth, consequently, would result in the inability to marry. This configuration creates a situation in which homosexuality occurs and is tolerated as a valve through which surplus sexual tension can be released. On sexual passivity, which Freud describes as a quality ‘whose nature is undoubtedly homosexual’\textsuperscript{58} it can be said that such passivity would be disputed and rejected by the Islamic male involved. Since the dichotomy of active and passive, with its pejorative sexual connotations again proves to be an element of a culture which allocates certain sexual behaviour patterns to the sexual partners along gender lines, in a society which does not operate within those boundaries, their narrowness becomes all too obvious.

I now want to look at the social and historical climate in which Freud’s theory of origin was conceived. Michel Foucault, in La Volonte de Savoir, notes that the last three centuries, in particular the nineteenth century, have seen a ‘veritable discursive explosion’ and ‘fermentation’ about sexuality.\textsuperscript{59} And he continues by pointing out that this was a process whereby perversions were incorporated, or literally made flesh, and whereby individuals were specified as perverse. Concerning homosexuality, Foucault claims that the nineteenth century “created for the homosexual, a past, a history, a childhood, a character and a form of life...”\textsuperscript{60}

A possible explanation might be found in the social, economical and political situation of that particular era. If we look at the political circumstances of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, we can see an empire in terminal decay. Political instability promotes social apprehension, uncertainty and existential angst. To this scenario has to be added the economical upheaval caused by the enforced change from an agricultural to an industrial economy, which in turn meant social hardship in the form
of unemployment, migration and thus the collapse of stable communities. Socially, the loss of continuity and tradition, along with a breakdown of the old hierarchies and established authorities, created a volatile and explosive situation. The ruling class, in an attempt to prevent its eclipse and in order to escape public wrath, was looking for a scapegoat upon which to shift blame and responsibility. The position of the scapegoat is often filled by minorities: the Jew being the most prominent one; the sexual outsider being another one. He, then, can conveniently be blamed, for instance, for undermining, through his existence and conduct, a society which is founded on gender dichotomy, procreation as the only legitimate form of sexual activity and the family as the core of the nation state.

By creating a scapegoat based on ‘sexual Abirrung’ from the norm, the state apparatus makes use of what Foucault calls the ‘compulsion to talk about sex’, which he traces back to the Christian pastoral and to the ritual of confession. For him, the confession mechanism has been used by church and state not only to extract the penitent’s conscious violation of the sexual code of conduct but to gain access, through his unconscious desire, which enters consciousness in the shape of the (sexual) phantasy, to the last retreat of freedom, and to subject it to the repression of the law.

Returning to the concrete function of the outsider, it can be seen as an extension of this process of prohibition by the law. The sexual outlaw is invented as an imaginary sexual monster, to absorb what cannot be sexually experienced because it lies outside prescribed sexuality or refuses repression. So the sexual monster becomes the personified manifestation of prohibited sexual phantasy and in his prosecution and imprisonment the projecting subject thinks to rid itself of its desire. The weakened subject overcomes his experience of social and sexual impotence by the pseudo-cathartic act of projecting his ‘unlawful’ desires upon a scapegoat. The subject hopes through the symbolic sacrifice of the outcast to rid itself of itself: Nature.

This dialectic seems to be absent from Freud’s contemplation. Moreover, by describing homosexuality as a ‘sexual Abirrung’ and accusing its practitioner of failing to ‘make the right decision in his object choice for the opposite sex’ Freud seems to have perpetuated the myth of the origin of homosexuality.

I would like to return just briefly to the concepts of gender dichotomy and procreation. Freud, deeply embedded in Judaic Christian culture and law, seems not to have reflected on the implication such a position would inevitably have on his theory of the origin of homosexuality. It seems he could not conceive of a sexual practice outside the socially enshrined Biblical commandment of procreation. However, as much as his unconscious and conscious thinking might or might not have been influenced by religious law, he certainly had incorporated Kantian Ethics, as he had the Critique of Pure and Practical Reason, as we will see when we discuss Freud’s concept of knowledge in a later chapter.

For the moment we will focus our attention on Kant’s influence on Freud and his views on gender, marriage and procreation and his theory of homosexuality. In paragraph 24 of the jurisdiction (Rechtslehre) in Metaphysik der Sitten, which is devoted to ‘The Rights of Domestic Community’ (Des Rechts der Häuslichen Gesellschaft), the first section is entitled ‘Marriage Law’ (Das Eherecht).

There Kant distinguishes between two kinds of sexual unions or as he calls them
**commerciun sexuale.** The first sexual union he defines as the mutual (wechselseitigen) use which a person has of the other’s organ and its function or: *usus membrorum et facultatum sexualium alterius* which describes the ‘natural’ use and which is characterised by ‘producing those of his kind’ (*seines Gleichen*). The second, of course, has to be the ‘unnatural’, which is based on the unnatural use of the organ and its function either on a person of the same sex or an animal. Such an act is condemned by Kant as a ‘transgression of the law’, ‘an unnatural vice’ (what is a natural vice, one wonders) *crimina carnis contra naturam* as he calls it. And he hastens to add that it is an ‘unmentionable’ act. He concludes by condemning indulgence in it in the strongest possible form: ‘no exceptions or excuses can be employed in its name and can save the practitioner from being ejected from the human community’.

Then he goes on to define further the natural sexual union. While the first one is based on purely animal instinct, *vaga libido, fornicatio*, the second one is the natural sexual union: marriage which is sanctioned by the law. Marriage, *matrimonium*, he goes on to say, is the coming together of two people of different sex for the life-long ownership of their *Geschlechtseigenschaften* – their ‘mutual sexual organs and functions’. The ‘purpose’ of this arrangement, Kant elaborates, is the procreation of children. He describes this purpose (*Zweck*) as a ‘purpose of Nature’ (*Zweck der Natur*) which is ‘the desire for each other, implanted in the sexes by nature’.

After this discourse we see more clearly how deeply Freud’s argument is rooted in the Kantian Ethics which constituted the backbone of the social and juridical norm of Freud’s time and ours. Hence, I would suggest, Freud’s theory on the origin of homosexuality emanated from the Kantian law which could not conceive of any sexual practice other than the one within the marriage contract. All other forms of sexual activity were rejected (*verworfen*). I would argue that the psycho-genesis of homosexuality reinforces and ‘refines’ the Kantian paragraph’s implication.

Freud’s theory in which the homosexual takes the position of the woman in the sexual act fits neatly into the gender dichotomy which lies at the core of Kant’s view and judgment of the sexual act. For Freud, the homosexual desires to be the woman; he desires to play the passive role in the sexual act. His notions of the effeminisation (*Entmannung* and *Verweiblichung*), of the homosexual who has disposed of his maleness, have contributed to and strengthened a cliché and typification of the homosexual as more of a woman than a man. And though he goes to great lengths to show that the feminine attitude of a man to the father and other men is present in neurotics and ‘healthy’ people too, the myth of the homosexual as the exclusively feminine male lives on in the unconscious even of people who would consciously deny having homophobic tendencies, tendencies which are betrayed in the Freudian slip.

On the point of Freud’s allegation of the homosexual identifying with the woman and occupying the female/passive role in the sexual encounter, it can be noted that his empirical research and its theoretical conclusions were strongly influenced by the social climate and prejudice against the ‘unnatural act’. Freud’s observations on the homosexual as effeminate and passive are in fact more complicated than Freud’s theory suggests. Its cause lies in the homosexual’s identification with the heterosexual’s projection of his repressed homosexuality. The homosexual becomes in mimicry the caricature of the heterosexual’s unconscious. So what Freud identifies as an individual psychic condition is in fact socially determined and governed by the dialectic of the repressed desire in the law.
Generally, progress in de-criminalising homosexuality is being welcomed, even if it seems too slow sometimes for the victims of legalisation. However, there is ground for caution. For instance, it could be argued that contemporary gay acceptance has more to do with the general transformation of society and its members into consumer entities than with genuine change in the socio-psychic structure of society. In the age of 'I consume, therefore I am', the subject is primarily judged by his spending power rather than his colour, religious affiliation or sexual orientation. Post-industrial societies have become dependent for their ‘naked’ survival on economic growth. And I would suggest that one of the major factors for society going ‘soft’ on homosexuality lies here. In a society which depends on its economic performance, production and consumption cannot afford the luxury of discriminating against potential contributors.

Furthermore, I would state, the subject’s subjugation to the law of economic growth has penetrated his most intimate sphere: sexuality. The conveyer belt and reproduction ideology has conferred upon the sexual act the ‘dignity of the good’. Unlike Freud’s era, which still required the iron Kantian rule to sustain itself, contemporary society prides itself on integrating what Kant feared most: sexual desire. Western civilisation of the post industrial type has overcome that fear (or at least thinks it has) by absorbing it. That which Kant thought would paralyse any social order were it not domesticated has transcended into a commodity. The ‘mutual use of somebody else’s sexual organ and its function’ (Geschlechtseigenschaften) can readily be had like any other consumer article. So I would suggest that in an environment of sexual saturation, the sexual prejudice loses its overtness. However, should the need arise for a scapegoat, it most surely will re-emerge from its eternal and universal latency, as can be observed, for instance, in the new wave of antisemitism in Eastern European countries, which, beset with economic difficulties, social change and political vacuum, need a sacrificial victim on which to project their fear. So I would conclude this thought by reiterating that the prosecution of the outlaw might abate temporarily, yet his hope of being granted the dignity of the other will always remain an already lost illusion.

In my view, a comprehensive analysis of the phenomenon of homosexuality can only be completed if we shift our attention from a psychogenesis which roots itself in the mother/son relation to a psychogenesis of the civilisatory process per se and thereby re-modulate the theory of the origin of homosexuality into a critique on civilisation. For our purpose, I will in particular focus on the Enlightenment project because it enlisted our main proponents: Kant and Freud. Both shared, in their thinking and theoretical writing, the deep-felt conviction that man’s salvation lies with the civilisationary process and man’s ascent to the ‘heights’ of the Kulturmensch.

Let me begin my argument by taking you back to the projection mechanism which I introduced earlier. There I argued that the ‘weak’ subject in its constant fear of encountering its true subjectivity, which is the subjectivity of its unconscious, will in a desperate attempt to prevent that feared encounter, externalise its repressed desires through the mechanism of projection, in which an external object becomes the manifestation of what the subject fears in itself. Once located, the external object is transformed into a scapegoat and can be manipulated as such, culminating in its being exterminated as the symbolic sacrifice for the true life, the life which the subject feared to live. The scapegoat dies for the life its prosecutor did not dare to live.
Please let me hasten to disentangle the web I just layed out before you. For that I will take you back to Kant and his Ethics. The structure of civilisation is the structure of the totality of the law. It governs the subject’s behaviour not according to its mimetic desires but to the principle of freedom from it. Freedom, for Kant, lies in the subject’s act of becoming conscious of itself. Thus it emancipates itself from the law and dominance of Nature and becomes an integral part of Reason, the Verstandswelt, which it comes to regard as its ‘predestined and true habitat’. As a conscious subject, it recognises the law of bourgeois society as an expression of its duties. “Duty...is a forceful calling of a purified desire by the law,” as Kant puts it in the Introduction to his Ethics. The ethical relation emanates from the subject’s identification with and legitimisation of it. From it, the subject derives, for Kant, his moral duties, which become the drive (Triebfeder) of his action. The idea of the ethical culminates when obedience to the law becomes desire. Here Kant attempts nothing less than the eradication of desire, the desire of the Other. Instead, he substitutes for it an ‘autonomous’ and ‘dignified’ subject whose inner determinations (innere Bestimmungen) are the commonly agreed maxims of moral conduct, of Reason. The internalised Ethics of the law, according to Kant, will guarantee the freedom, grounded in the law, which will be the standard on which the legality of all action will be measured, and which will guarantee the subject's ‘bliss’ (Glückseligkeit), which he describes as a “contentment in a state of whose continuation one has consciously assured oneself.”

For Kant, freedom is freedom from the unpredictability of Nature (Rohigkeit der Natur). The subject’s drive, desire (Willkür) is homogenised and ‘domesticated’. The act of becoming conscious is the act of identification at the price of vacating the ability to experience ‘affinity to the non-identical’. It is followed by submission to the identifiable, the law which ‘restructures’ it to the requirement of bourgeois norm and capitalist production. The desire which drove the subject towards the non-identical has become the desire for knowledge and the good (commodity).

In the Kantian philosophical edifice we see a radical re-assessment of the relation between man and Nature, subject and alterity. Kant conceives what Adorno calls ‘anamnesis of the uninhibited pre-I impulse’ (vor-ichlicher Impulse) — man’s remembrance of his primordial past — as a threat to the common good (Gemeinwesen). His ideal and objective is autogenesis. The subject wills itself ex nihilo. Reason, cleansed of any contamination by desire; Nature. It sets up its own rule as a universal norm. Reason produces itself in Kant’s morality. The subject’s autogenesis is his great contribution to the establishing of a social (bourgeois) order which is ‘cleansed’ of subjective, heterogeneous desire and governed by the law of Reason.

Let me focus on the concept of mimesis which I introduced just now. It has its origin in Pythagoras’ musical theory. It emphasised the importance of rhythm, which would elevate the dancer to a state of ekstasis in which he transcends his individual status and become enthused by the God and is drawn to the non-identical, the Other by affinity. In rhythm, man becomes the instrument, the echo of the Other, Nature, the Divine. Thus, in the mimetic non-encounter, the subject loses its individuality and, in a state of pure subjectivity, encounters the other as Other, in its heterogeneity. Plato gives mimesis a further dimension when, in the Laws, he points to the cathartic effect of mimesis. There, he says, mimesis heals the human soul of fear. Out of this fear, we have seen Reason born as man’s ‘shield’ against nature. In Reason, man attempts to overcome death.
The mimetic relation as non-violent communion in the Other in its heterogeneity contrasts with the Enlightenment project which not only interrupted the mimetic relation but reversed it. The subject, in its autogenesis, constitutes itself through homogenising the Other into the identical. This process effects the subject’s relation to its own Nature which is drawn to the Other in mimesis. Socrates, as we saw, described it as the ‘mystery of love’ and for Adorno this ‘mystery’ becomes “the power to see the other and relate to it mimetically.”

In autogenesis, Nature is rationalised, re-invented in the identical. The mimetic relation is consciously reconstructed in projection and mimicry. The subject consciously and compulsively re-invents what it has to repress in the autogenetic act, the non-identical, the Other, its Nature. In mimicry, it invents and projects its repressed Nature upon those whom it blames for its loss: the Jew and the sexual outlaw. Afraid of recognising itself as the inventor of Reason, it projects its wrath upon the Jew, whom as the founder of monotheism, it identifies as the source of Rationality. The antisemite blames the emergence of a monotheistic god and, with it, rational comprehension, on the Chosen People. Thus antisemitism is the projection of the subject to the law of Reason upon the Jew.

Likewise the self-imposed incest taboo is projected and blamed on the sexual outlaw. Thus the Jew, the sexual outsider, become catalyst through projection and the device of mimicry for the violent re-enactment of the subject’s repressed mimetic relation with un-subjected Nature.

The Jew and the sexual outsider are caricatures of the tortured subject. They represent the externalised repressed desire which in its immemorial memory still remembers the echo of the Other resonating in its pure subjectivity, its unconscious. Antisemitism and homophobia are manifestations of the inverted desire for re-entering the rationality of the mimetic relation. But the compulsive addiction to the irrationality of Reason, as constituted in the narcissistic identification as relation with the Other in identification, forces the subject to destroy the Other, its own Nature, in the destruction of projected self: the Jew, the sexual outlaw. In the act of destruction, the subject desires to rid itself of that part of itself, its pure subjectivity, which reminds it of its origin in Nature. However, like Sisyphus, it will never succeed. Hence the ritual is being re-enacted infinitely, mimicking Nietzsche’s circle of eternal recurrence and thus attesting to the subject’s enslavement to itself in Reason.

Freud’s tragedy lay in him being equally promoter and victim of a programme he had dedicated his life and work to. His belief in the project of Enlightenment drove his quest for knowledge, so marvellously analysed in Leonardo. He regarded Reason and, in it, the Kulturmensch as the defence against Nature ruling in man’s Willkür and Rohigkeit. But then, as he experienced himself, the process of civilisation turned against itself in the triumph of pure irrationality over the rationality of mimetic Nature in the emergence of the totalitarian state. In Fascism, the irrationality of Reason was unleashed and turned into a violent appropriation of reified Nature (verrohte Natur) by de-subjectified man. There, man resolved to recuperate in violent embrace what in its very constitution as subject he had sealed himself off from: Nature, his pure subjectivity, in which he related with Nature mimetically.

The argument of this paper was continued in a further three lectures.
Notes:

4 PFL, ibid., p. 57. “Der Psychoanalyse erscheint vielmehr die Unabhängigkeit der Objektwahl vom Geschlecht des Objektes, die gleich freie Verfügung über männliche und weibliche Objekte, wie sie im Kindesalter, in primitiven Zuständen und frühgeschichtlichen Zeiten zu beobachten ist, als das Ursprüngliche, aus dem sich durch Einschränkung nach der einen oder der anderen Seite der normale wie der Inversionstypus entwickein.” SA, ibid., p. 56.
6 PFL, ibid., p. 58; “Subjekt homoerotikers, der sich als Weib fühlt und benimmt, und des Objekt homoerotikers, der durchaus männlich ist und nur das weibliche Objekt gegen ein gleichgeschlechtliches vertauscht hat.” SA, ibid., p. 57.
8 ‘Curiosity’ seems to me too mild a word to convey the driving force which is contained in the German Wissbegierde, which could be more adequately and literally translated as a ‘desire to know’, even ‘desire for knowledge’, ‘will to knowledge’. The German carries an element of impatience, a hunger for knowledge, recognition through empirical identification (Erkenntnis). Cf. Freud, S., Leonardo da Vinci and A Memory of His Childhood (1910), PFL, Vol. 14, p. 186; Eine Kindheitserinnerung des Leonardo da Vinci, SA. X, p. 120.
9 PFL, ibid., SA, ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 My presentation of the Freudian argument, here, is based on the German text, which I translated, since the James Strachey translation fails to convey the subtlety of the Freudian German. (Freud was honoured for his literary contribution with the Goethe prize) PFL, ibid., p. 186/187; SA, ibid., p. 121.
12 In a footnote he lists the work of I. Sadger, W. Stekel and S. Ferenczi in support of his theory. See PFL, ibid., pp. 190; SA, ibid., p. 124.
13 “....der Knabe dem weiblichen Einfluss preisgegeben....” SA, ibid., p. 125.
14 Cf. SA., ibid., p.125.
15 Cf. ibid.
16 Cf. ibid., p. 107.
17 For the argument of ‘against’ and ‘between’, cf. footnote 1 in: PFL, ibid., p. 172.
18 Ibid.
19 SA., ibid., p. 113.
20 Cf. SA., ibid., p. 112 ft.
21 Cf. SA., ibid., p. 116/117.
22 SA., ibid., p. 89.
23 “....das Versprechen schrankenloser Zärtlichkeit....”. SA., ibid., p. 130. My translation; PFL, ibid., p. 209.
25 Cf. SA., ibid., p. 124.
Auch die Gesichtszüge...zeigen eine geradezu unwillige Abwehr. Die Brauen sind gerunzelt, der Blick ist mit einem Ausdruck von Scheu seitwärts gerichtet....Dieses Gesicht lässt wahrlich weder die Lust des Liebesspendens noch die Seligkeit des Gewinns erkennen; es drückt nur Unwillen und Abscheu aus.

26 Cf. PFL, ibid., p. 190; SA., ibid., 124.
27 PFL, ibid., p. 168; SA., ibid., p. 105.
28 PFL, ibid.;
29 „...nach Wegen und Mitteln suchte, ein so unerwünschtes Ereignis zu verhüten.“ SA., ibid.
30 PFL, ibid., p. 169;
31 „Schub energetischer Sexualverdrängung“, SA., ibid., p. 106.
32 PFL, ibid.
33 Ibid., p. 170;
34 „...entgeht kraft besonderer Anlage der Denkhemmung wie dem neurotischen Denkzwang.“ SA., ibid.
35 PFL, ibid.;
36 „Der Sexualverdrängung, die ihn durch den Zuschuss von sublimierter Libido so stark gemacht hat, trägt er noch Rechnung, indem er die Beschäftigung mit sexuellen Themen vermeidet.“ SA., ibid., p. 107.
37 Ibid.
38 Cf. PFL, ibid., p. 178/9; SA., ibid., p. 115.
39 Cf. ibid.
40 Cf. PFL, ibid., p. 184; SA., ibid., p. 120.
41 Cf. PFL, ibid., pp. 227/8; SA, ibid., p. 156.
42 Cf. Benjamin, W., The Image of Proust in: Illuminations, New York, 1968, p. 201 - 217. Benjamin, elaborating on Proust's use of the metaphor as poetic device to convey Erkenntnis, goes on to say that: „Proust’s most accurate, most convincing insights fasten on their objects as insects fasten on leaves, blossoms, branches, betraying nothing of their existence until a leap, a beating of wings, a vault, show the startled observer that some incalculable life has imperceptibly crept into an alien world.” Benjamin's own use of metaphor in his critique proves his non-violent approach. In Benjamin, the artwork is treated as beyond identification, beyond positive Erkenntnis, as infinitely Other. Cf. also Blanchot, M., Proust in: The Siren’s Song. Harvester Press, 1982, p. 66-78.
43 „...grundlose Beschimpfung des grossen Mannes.“ SA., ibid., p. 100.
44 Ibid., p. 127.
45 PFL., ibid., 193;
46 „...Spuren von unverwandelter sexueller Neigung“. SA., ibid.
47 PFL, ibid., p. 162;
48 „Man wird ihm auch von sexueller Aktivität kein hohes Mass zumuten dürfen.“ SA., ibid., p. 100.
49 PFL., ibid., p. 193;
50 „Er war gülig und nachsichtig gegen sie, besorgte sie und pflegte sie selbst, wenn sie krank waren, wie seine eigene Mutter ihn betreut haben mochte.“ SA., ibid., p. 127.
51 Cf. PFL. ibid., p. 162;
52 „...(liefen nicht aus) in geschlechtliche Betätigung.“ SA., ibid., p. 100.
53 Cf. PFL, ibid., 194; SA., ibid., p. 128.
56 Plato, Republic in: ibid., p. 403 b-c.
58 PFL, ibid., p. 159;
59 „...unschön herabhängenden Schlappbrust“. SA., ibid., p. 98.
60 PFL, ibid., 161;
61 „...Frieden aber auch von sexueller Aktivität kein hohes Mass zumuten dürfen.“ SA., ibid., p. 100.
“...da muss wohl eine ganz besonders starke Sexualverdrängung als Ursache dieser solitären, beinahe grotesken Darstellung vermutet werden. Wenn man geniessen will, so pflegt man es sich so bequem als möglich zu machen....und beim Koitus liegt man normalerweise...gerade so bequem als möglich. Durch das Liegen wird gewissermassen das Wollen ausgedrückt, in der erwünschten Situation längere Zeit hindurch zu verweilen.” SA., ibid., p. 98.

PFL, ibid., p. 189;

“...unzweifelhaft homosexuellem Charakter.” SA., ibid., p. 124.


The German ‘Abirrungen’ implies a serious straying from what is considered ‘the norm’. Already the choice of the chapter heading suggests a prejudiced and unsympathetic approach by Freud. Cf. SA., ibid., Bd. V., p. 47 and cf. SA., ibid., Bd. X., footnote 1, p. 125.

Ibid., p. 125.


“Pflicht....is...eine Nötigung (Zwang) der freien Willkür durchs Gesetz”, ibid., p. 508.


“Glückseligkeit, d.i. Zufriedenheit mit seinem Zustande, sofern man der Fortdauer derselben gewiss ist...”, Kant, I., ibid, p. 517.


Ibid., p. 221.


Plato, Laws, ibid., 790 d - 791 b.
